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A stable macroeconomic environment  and a functioning market
economy are two essential preconditions for successful struc-
tural adjustment. Macroeconomic stability requires a low fiscal
deficit to support  extemal balance  and low inflation. Only under
these conditions can a  change in microeconornic incentives
succeed in developing resources to their most productive uses.
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Structural adjustment is an economywidc  economy (mcasured by the trade deficit), the
adjustment effort aimed at allocating resources  external terms of trade, and domestic measures
better.  Functioning markets and a low, stable  of commercial policy that allow for a differencc
inflation rate are two macroeconomic precondi-  between domestic and foreign prices.
tions for implementing structural adjustment,
contends Rodriguez.  He further concludes:  The instruments of the adjustment program
may affect the cquilP jrium  valucs of the key
In highly distorted economies,  the market  macroeconomic variables: inflation, the fiscal
system must be rcstored before adjustment  deficit, debt ratios, the trade balance, and the
efforts are undertaken.  An inflation ratc over 20  real exchange rate.  If they do, measures should
percent is likely in most countries to generate  be taken to keep the target variables at their
unstable prices that would impair adjustment.  desired levels and the endogenous variables at
their new equilibrium levels.
Fiscal deficits and policies about (intcrnal
and extemal) government debt are the key  In particular, the fiscal dcficit should be
determinants of the inflation process.  As a gen-  compatible with the acceptable inl.  ion rate-
eral rule, government debt as a fraction of GDP  and the real exchange rate should be at its
should not excecd the government's relative par-  equilibrium level.
ticipation in generating that GDP.
Macroeconomic stability is essential to both
Fiscal deficits are probably a key determi-  adjustment and growth. Given a stable macro-
nant of trade deficits - particularly when the  economic environment and the correct micro-
fiscal deficit is financed abroad. The trade  economic incentives, resources will be allocated
deficit generally depends on all variables  to their most productive use without additional
directly linked to the desired rate of foreign  macroeconomic incentives such as subsidized
savings.  Efforts should be made to estimate the  credit or an arbitrarily high real exchange rate.
equilibrium trade deficit with all available  Growth is best served by a functioning capital
relevant information, as this estimate is impor-  market; governments should not interfere by
tant in determining the real exchange rate.  controlling interest rates at below-cquilibrium
level, or targeting an arbitrarily high real ex-
The main determinants of the real exchange  change rate.
rate are the level of excess spending in the
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Structural adjustment is an economy wide adjustment effort
aimed at a better allocation of resources. Such a process is
bound to require an important degree of resource mobilization and
it is our opinion that this cannot be done in an environment of
macroeconomic instability or in the absence of a relatively well
functioning market system.
Macroeconomic adjustment therefore, enters at two levels
in the process of structural adjustment: first is the
need to implement a macroeconomic environment favorable to a
stable market framework  within which adjustment can take place;
second, there are the adjustments in key macroeconomic variables
required as a consequence of the implementation of the adjustment
program.
This paper is concerned with the identification of
macroeconomic policies consistent with the long run
sustainability of a stable market framework or with changes that
may be required as a consequence of the implementation of the
structural adjustment program. It is not directly concerned with
issues of short run stabilization, although those issues,
particularly that of the timing of policies will be mentioned
whenever relevant.
Macroeconomic Policies Aiming at a Stable Market Framework.
In highly distorted economies where the price system plays
little or no role in resource allocation we recommend that the
first efforts, prior to the implementation of the adjustment
program, be oriented at the restoration of the market system.
Quantity constraints, as well as price controls and other types
of income policies are incompatible  with the resource
reallocation effort required for a successful structural
adjustment. These measures, however, are often used in the
context of short run stabilization programs.  Therefore, if short
run stabilization calls for the use of these type of policies, it
is recommended that significant structural adjustment efforts be
1postponed until a reasonable degree of functioning of the price
system has been restored. As an example, we would discourage any
attempt at Trade Reform in the context of an anti-inflation plan
based on the use of price controls and/or an overvalued exchange
rate.
It is also found that structural adjustment cannot succeed
in the context of high inflation. High inflation usually means
unstable inflation and is the result of some fundamental
macroeconomic disequilibrium. The adjustment program must
incorporate  macroeconomic policies aiming at the achievement of
sustainable long run macroeconomic stability at an acceptable
inflation rate. The level of such an acceptable inflation rate
will vary from country to country depending on the inflation
history as well as the structure of financial markets. It is our
judgment, however, that an inflation rate in excess of 20% per
year is likely, in most countries, to be unstable enough to
generate relative price variability that would impair the
structural adjustment effort.
Functioning markets and a low and stable inflation rate are
therefore two macroeconomic preconditions for tile  implementation
of structural adjustment.
We find fiscal deficits and policies regarding government
external and internal debt as the key determinants of the
inflation process. Fiscal deficits are the main source of
creation of means of payments that fuel inflation. Inflation can
be postponed by resorting to debt financing. However, debt
financing in excess of the rollover of the inflationary comnonent
on existing debt stocks plus some allowance for real growth of
the economy increases real (and  relative) debt and therefore
contributes to the crowding out of private investment ,  to the
generation of balance of payments problems and to larger future
fiscal deficits on account of a higher interest service.
The inflation adjusted fiscal  deficit of the public sector
must be compatible with the maintenance of the acceptable
inflation rate without need to resort to increases in the
relative size of stocks of public debt. As a general rule, we
propose that government debt as a fraction of GDP should not
exceed the relative participation of the government sector in the
generation of such GDP. This rule will define the debt/GDP ratios
that in turn are required for defining the fiscal deficit
compatible with the acceptable inflation rate. A precise
formulation of these relationships is presented in Section IV.
2Available empirical evidence suggests that fiscal deficits are
one of the main determinants of Trade Deficits. This is clearly
the case whenever the fiscal deficit is financed abroad. It is
also the case whenever the deficit is financed internally and the
private sector responds by increasing its foreign indebtedness.
In general, however, the trade def'cit will depend on all
variables directly linked to the s.3sired  rate of foreign savings.
Efforts should be made at estimating the equilibrium trade
deficit with all available relevant information  as this
estimation is essential for the determination of the real
exchange exchange rate.
We vies the real exchange rate as the relative price that
allows the expenditure and production switching among the
categories of Traded and Non-Traded goods. Being a relative
price, the real exchange rate is an endogenous variable and the
purpose of policy should be that it remains at its equilibrium
level. We find the main determinants of the real exchange rate to
be the level of excess spending in the economy (measured  by the
trade deficit), the external terms of trade and domestic measures
of commercial policy that allow for a difference between domestic
and foreign prices. In Section III we derive an expression for
determining the equilibrium value of the real exchange rate as
function of the trade surplus, the terms of trade and export and
import average ad-valorem tariffs. We recommend that similar
expressions be estimated for each country doing adjustment
programs and that it be used to insure the compatibility between
the real exchange rate and the other macroeconomic variables
determining it.
We have therefore obtained a basic structure for insuring a
global compatibility of macroeconomic tools and objectives among
a relatively small set of variables. The acceptabip inflation
rate and Debt/GDP ratios define the compatible fiscal
deficit(surplus). The fiscal deficit plus the terms of trade and
other relevant variables determining the desired rate of foreign
savings (like the availability of voluntary foreign financing,
levels of interest rates, foreign investment,actual  stocks of
foreign assets held, etc.) will provide an estimate of the
equilibrium Trade Balance. This level of the Trade Balance, in
turn, and jointly with the terms of trade and domestic trade
tariffs and taxes, determines the equilibrium level of the real
exchange rate. If the country manages the nominal exchange rate,
we recommend that it be set such that the equilibrium level of
the real exchange rate can be obtained without need for
inflationary or deflationary adjustment in domestic prices of
Non-Traded goods.
3The line of macroeconomic causality we have developed here  is
not widely accepted among policymakers and it is therefore worth
emphasize the differences once again. We view the Trade Balance
as a macroeconomic variable resulting from aggregate decisions
concerning the difference between income and expenditure.  As
such it depends crucially on those variables that determine the
desired rate of accumulation of foreign assets. A Trade Surplus
requires that resources move away from the Non-Traded sector into
the Traded sector and the Real Exchange Rate is the relative
price that allows for this expenditure switching to take place.
We therefore view the Rpal Exchange Rate as being determined by
the Trade Balance and not viceversa.  We do not recommend using
a real devaluation in order to improve on the Trade Balance
unless the accompanying required expenditure reducing policy is
also put in effect. If the last measure is not done, the end
result will likely be inflation, as discussed in detail in
Section IV.2.
Macroeconomic Policies During the Structural Adjustment Program
Adjustment programs may differ widely from c.untry to country
and depending on the particular sectors being dealt with. It is
therefore very diffi.cult  to find a general set of rules linking
macroeconomic variables and the specific instruments of the
adjustment programs.
As a general rule we propose that macroeconomic policies
during the adjustment program be aimed at maintaining the stable
macroeconomic framework described previously.
The instruments of the adjustment program may  have an
effect on the equilibrium  values of the key macroeconomic
variables described before: Inflation, Fiscal Deficit, Debt
Ratios, Trade Balance and Real Exchange Rate. If that is the
case, measures should be taken so that the target variables
remain at their desired levels and the endogenous variables
remain at their new equilibrium levels.
In particular, we see the need to instrument measures so that
the fiscal deficit remains compatible with the acceptable
inflation rate and the real exchange rate remains at its
equilibrium level.
4With regards to the fiscal deficit, it is bound to be
affected by any changes having to do with fiscal, financial or
trade reform. Whenever distorting taxes or expenditures are
modified as a consequence of the adjustment program, new less
distorting taxes or expenditures  must be found so that the fiscal
deficit remains near the target level compatible with the
acceptable inflation rate.
A fiscal reform program may very well produce a sustainable
reduction in the fiscal deficit and therefore will allow for a
permanent reduction in the acceptable inflation rate. That being
the case, the Trade Balance is likely to improve and this will
have effects on the equilibrium level of the Real Exchange Rate.
The program must therefore allow for the required accommodation
in the level of the Real Exchange Rate.
Changes in the levels of trade taxes or tariffs are bound to
affect the equilibrium level of the Real Exchange rate and the
program must specify what is the required change in this variable
as a consequence of the trade reform.  We view Real Exchange Rate
adjustment in the face of Trade Reform as a crucial ingredient
for the viability of such reform. There is abundant experience
with Trade Reforms that failed  precisely because of the lack of
adjustment in this critical macroeconomic variable.
Macroeconomic Policies and Economic Growth
A high and sustainable rate of growth is one of the main
purposes of structural adjustment.  We view macroeconomic
stability as an essential ingredient for adjustment to be
successful and therefore as contributing to growth. In other
words, the set of policies we have described as
contributing to a stable  macroeconomic environment is also
required for growth to take place.
In general terms, we do not favor the use of specific
macroeconomic policies for promoting growth to the extent that
these may interfere with efficient resource allocation.  More
specifically, we feel that given a stable macroeconomic
environment and the ccrrect microeconomic incentives, resources
will be allocated to their most productive use without need for
additional macroeconomic incentives, such as subsidized credit or
an arbitrarily high real exchange rate.
5It is the case, however, tiuat  government spending may crowd
out private spending, and investment in particular, unless it is
fully financed abroad. This fact is not enough to make a case
against any government spending that will be done at the expense
of private investment as the productivity of the former may be
higher than that of the later.  This will certainly be the case of
government spending aimed at providing the basic infrastructure
needed for markets to operate. For other types of spending we can
only recommend a careful evaluation and comparison of social
rates of return both of the new activities as well as of the
displaced activities.
Other macroeconomic instruments  that are often present  in
the discussion of growth oriented policies are the real interest
rates and the real exchange rate. Both are endogenous variables
and we do not recommend policies aiming at keeping them away from
their equilibrium values, even for the purposes of fostering
growth. For example, growth is best served by a well functioning
capital market and th!  is best obtained when governmevts do not
try to interfere by controlling interest rates at below than
equilibrium levels.
Section VI presents a brief summary of the recommended
macroeconomic policies. A detailed discussion and justification
of the recommended policies is provided in Sections II-V.
6II.MACROECONG.'TC  ASPECTS OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
II.1 Structural Adjustment and Balance of Payments Problems
More than often, countries aiming at structural adjustment
programs are facing immediate balance of payments difficulties.
External funds, therefore, become a precondition for the
implementation of the structural adjustment program. The balance
of payments support fund m-.y  have little to do with the needs of
external funds as a result of the adjustment program and more as
a way to buy the needed time to start the design and
implementation of the program.
Structural adjustment relies on giving incentives for resource
reallocation to their most efficient uses. For that to take place
we see it as fundamental that adjustment rely on market forces
and be implemented  within a relatively stable macroeconomic
framework. There is little hope for resource mobilization in a
country experiencing rampart inflation or running a balance of
payments deficit that generates expectation of some still
unspecified  type of policy intervention,  be it devaluation, QR's
or other type of trade restrictions. With regard to the balaence
of payment, therefore, we feel that the adjustment program maust
specifically address the correction of the problem even if it is
not directly addressed to the trade sector.
I1.2  The Role of Fiscal Deficits
Balance of payments problems are usually a symptom of more
fundamental disequilibrium than a simple deterioration of the
terms of trade or of access to foreign  markets. If that were to
be the case, there would be little adjustment the country could
do to solve then. It is the case, however, that most perdurable
balance of payments problem are the result of internal
macroeconomic disequilibrium. They usually come together with
other symptoms like high inflation and high fiscal  deficits. They
may also be the result of huge private capital inflows that
foster aggregate  demand and generate both inflation and current
account deficits, as it was the case for many countries in the
late 70's.
7It is very unlikely, however, that a country "suffering"
from large  capital  inflows  will  feel the  need to start an economy
wide struct1ural  adjustment effort.  As a practical matter,
therefore, most cases of structural adjustment will deal with
situations where the balance of payments problems take place in a
country  where the excess spending is due mostly, if not
uniquely, to internal conditions, among which we would single out
the fiscal behavior of the government sector.
It is our view that fiscal deficits are the single most
important factor determining the poor current account performance
of the majority of  countries implementing  structural adjustment
programs. While it would be possible that fiscal deficits be
financed internally, this is not usually the case, at least over
the medium run that is relevant for the implementation of
adjustment p:.ograms. Internal financing of fiscal deficits is
possible either through the issuance of more internal interest
bearing debt or through the inflation tax. Regarding debt
financing, it would be sustainable in the long run only if the
real interest rate paid on the public debt falls short of the
growth rate of the economy. While there might be exemptions, we
do not feel this is likely to be the case for the type of
countries in need of structural adjustment,  where one of the main
problems is the lack of capital in the economy. To show but one
example, in the period 1982-1987, the compound real rate of
interest in Argentina on first rate customers was 22% annual
while the compound growth rate of GDP was a mere 1.4% annual.
Under those circumstances, any amount of debt financing is an
invitation for exponentially growing deficits on account of real
interest on debt.
Inflation financing also has serious problems. A structural
adjustment program should never accept a high inflation rate as a
genuine form of long term financing. From a practical point of
view we think that inflation, when used for revenue purposes,
leads to high rates that quickly reach the three digit levels. At
that rate, inflation turns highly unstable, variability of
relative prices becomes a significant  problem and the deficit
itself grows as a consequence of lags in tax collection. High
inflation countries, as the experience of several Latinoamerican
countries shows, have the most unstable real sectors and show the
poorest performance when compared with the availability of
resources.
Some low rate of inflation, probably not in excess of 20%
annual may still be compatible with structural adjustment from
the point of view that it may turn out to be relatively stable,
predictable and do not interfere much with resource allocation.
While its elimination would still be desirable, it may not be an
important obstacle  to the implementation oL  structural
8adjustments in the real sectors (it  may still be a problem if the
adjustment is to be in the financial or banking sector). Such an
inflation experience may be exemplified  with the case of
Colombia, a country that has had a relatively stable inflation
rate, ranging between 15% and 30% during the last 15 years, while
being able to maintain a compound annual growth rate of real GDP
of 4.3%  during the same period.
It is the case, however, that the low rates of inflation
compatible with structural adjustment are poor providers of
fiscal revenue in comparison with the fiscal  needs of these
countries. In the case of Colombia, the velocity of circulation
of Base Money has been around 10 during those 15 years. This
means that an annual inflation of 20% would be able to finance a
deficit of about 1.8% of GDP.2/
As a general rule, we propose to define the maximum
acceptable deficit as the one that if financed solely through the
inflation tax would generate an inflation rate that if sustained
will be just compatible with the structural adjustment. If there
is justifiable evidence that part of this deficit can be financed
in a sustainable way through increases in the real levels of
internal or external debt, the minimum deficit should be raised
accordingly by this extra sustainable amount. Detailed
quantification of these relations will be presented in Section V.
For most countries in need of structural adjustment,
however, we feel that they probably have reached the limits for
their access to capital markets (both internal and external) and
that an optimist hypothesis is that at most they would be a&le to
maintain their real levels of public indebtedness  through a more
or less automatic refinancing of the inflation component of the
nominal interest burden. From that perspective, we think that a
deficit figure that assumes automatic refinancing of the
inflation component of the public debt should not exceed a level
that would be consistent with a stable inflation rate of about
20% annual. Although such number should be subject to caieful
estimation in each particular case, we feel the Colombian
estimate of 2% deficit as a fraction of GDP presented previously
could be considered as a reasonable reference for the average of
the countries involved in adjustment programs.
---------------------------------------------------
2/ The exact formulae used is : INF= V.(Def/GDP), where INF is
the logarithmic inflation rate and V=l0.The derivation of this
expression will be presented in Section V.
9In summary, large inflation adjusted fiscal deficits are
likely to be incompatible  with a successful adjustment effort,
either because they generate balance of payments problems or
unacceptable high rates of inflation. The alternative of
financing the deficits with real increases in internal debt
should be ruled out whenever the real interest rate on public
debt exceeds the growth rate of the economy, as it is usually the
case. The alternative of foreign financing, other than the
automatic roll-over of the inflation component of the interest,
also does not seem reasonable given the actual circumstances in
the international capital markets regarding the problem with
third world debt.
There is another argument against fiscal deficits in the
context of adjustment programs aiming at resource mobilization,
particularly trade and financial reform programs. In general, an
economy with a high fiscal deficit is characterized by a little
of each of the three bad effects we have mentioned abc,e: current
account deficit, high inflation and high real rates of interest
as a result of the crowding out of the private sector in the
credit market.
A trade :eform program aims, among other things, at improving
the current account balance.  This objective can never be
obtained unless absorption is reduced relative to income. The
maintenance of the fiscal deficit implies that all the
expenditure reduction effort should fall on the private sector,
something hard to obtain in these economies usually already
overburdened by overgrown public sectors. In consequence, it will
be very difficult for resources to be freed so that they can move
to the traded sector of the economy. If that is the case, the
price incentive effects usually associated with trade reform will
not be effective, as there will be no net resources to be shifted
into the traded sector for the generation of a trade surplus. In
consequence, the price incentives are more likely to result in
higher inflation( if there is real devaluation) of just more
imports (if  there is tariff reduction or reduction of import
quotas) without resources moving into the export sector.
Similarly, to the extent that the government's borrowing
generates high real rates of interest, normally in excess of the
productivity of investment, and the fact that the government is
usually  willing to continue its financing at whatever level such
rates take, may imply that lending to the government will
systematically be the most attractive option in the market.
Therefore, it is likely  that any effort to increase private
savings through financial reform may end up in those extra
savings being channeled to the government who may find an
opportunity to finance through the improved capital market a
10larger fraction of its deficit.  In summary, if the objective of
the financial reform is to foster private savings and channel
those resources to productive private investment, ceilings must
be imposed as to the use of those resources by the public sector.
Even in the case of public sector borrowing ceilings, the
deficit will continue crowding out private investment either
through the demonetization due to the inflation tax or by using a
larger fraction of the country limits imposed on the available
external credit.
In summary, we find that large inflation adjusted fiscal
deficits are a serious obstacle to structural adjustment by
contributing to current account deficits, high real rates of
interest, crowding out of productive private investment and,
finally, contributing to generate high rates of inflation that in
turn seriously distort the efficient allocation of resources. For
all of the above we feel that inflation adjusted deficit targets
compatible with a reasonable inflation rate and sustainable rates
of  public borrowing should be an essential ingredient in the
design of the structural adjustment programs.
II.3  Public Debt and the Real Rate of Interest
A  related point has to do with whether to accept as reasonable
any existing level of internal public debt from the perspective
of the effects it may have on the real cost of credit to the
private sector. In an economy open to international capital
markets, private access to credit is independent of the rate of
government borrowing, as any difference between credit demand and
internal supply will be covered by capital inflows at the
international interest rate. Assuming Purchasing Power Parity
over the medium term, capital inflows  will thus tend to equalize
the domestic real interest rate with the international.  We may
assume that the international  real cost of credit is the best
alternative open to a capital importing country. In this
scenario, therefore, the level of the real internal public debt
is irrelevant for the determination of the real cost of credit.
Since the early 80's, new flows of capital to developing
countries have all but disappeared and the only significant flows
remaining are those coming from multilateral institutions that
are mostly devoted to the refinancing of external interest owed
to private creditors. From a practical point of view, therefore,
it is better to proceed with the assumption that there is no
access to new international  borrowing for the typical LDC in need
11of an adjustment program.
Under those circumstances, the real interest rate is
determined by the supply and demand for internal credit in the
country in question. The level of internal government debt
becomes therefore an important determinant of the real cost of
credit. We know that in many countries this real interest rate
reaches levels that far exceed the productivity of investment and
as a  consequence structural adjustment becomes all but impossible
to implement. It is difficult to ascertain the precise
quantitative effects of public debt on the real interest rate for
a single country (the  issue is still highly debated even in the
U.S. economy) and much more to derive a general rule applicable
to the group of countries in need of structural adjustment.
As a general rule we propose that the government should not
borrow more, relative to the private sector, than the share the
government sector  represents in the economy. This criteria
clearly defines the maximum admissible level of public debt. In
some cases it will be hardly possible to determine the total size
of the internal credit market as much of the credit runs through
non-institutionalized channels. In part, this is precisely the
effects of the financial repression generated by an excessive
rate of government borrowing. Under those circumstances, the
least that can be done is to place limits to the access  of
government to the still existing institutional  channels. For
example, commercial bank credit is an important source of credit
and easy to measure. Governments tend to tapper this market
through several channels, including reserve requirements,
compulsory deposits, direct sales of public debt to commercial
banks, operations of national or provincial banks, etc. A ceiling
of total government debt to the banking system can be easily
imposed therefore assuring that some funds remain accessible to
the financing of private sector investments.
We see, therefore, that in some cases, not only real
public debt should not be allowed to increase but it may be
required for it to be reduced if it is seen to be a factor in
generating real interest rates in excess of the productivity of
investment. For those cases, the program must plan for the
generation of government surpluses aiming at the reduction of the
stock of public debt. While this requirement may sound as
extremely ambitious, it should be noticed that the essential
aspect of structural adjustment is productive resource
mobilization in the private sector and that this will hardly
happen when the real cost of credit exceeds the productivity of
investment.
12For all of the above, we feel that another objective in
structural adjustment programs should be the attainment of well
defined targets for the real value of public debt. This may mean
that for some time, the actual deficit may have to be below what
is regarded as the sustainable deficit rate and may even have to
turn into a surplus until public debt reaches what is considered
to be the sustainable level.
II.4  Real Exchange Rate Aspects of Trade Reform
Most of adjustment programs aim at some form of trade
expansion oriented reforms. On a priori basis it is impossible to
say what is the optimal level of foreign trade of an economy. In
general, we know that the optimal level of trade depends on
country specij'ic  variables like size, factor  proportions,
technology, location, etc..The actual level of trade, in turn, is
determined by the above factors plus the whole set of
intervention in the related markets, both as a result of domestic
or foreign policies.
Granted that trade expansion is an important objective into
the structural adjustment programs, the question is what are the
essential macroeconomic ingredients  required for it to be
successful. We must here distinguish between those adjustments
aiming at trade expansion and those calling for an improvement in
the Trade Balance. As we have seen before, the Trade Balance is
the result of a difference between income and expenditure on
goods and services and as such is essentially a macroeconomic
phenomenon determined by macroeconomic variables, among which we
find the fiscal deficit to be the most relevant one. Very open
economies may have Trade Deficits (like  the U.S.) or Trade
Surpluses (like Germany) that are mostly determined by fiscal
results and private capital flows.  On the other hand, very closed
economies may have Trade Surpluses (Argentina 1982-87) or Trade
Deficits (Argentina 1979-81).
All of the above seem to suggest that there is no relation
between the degree of openness and the net results of trade as
measured by the Trade Surplus. This is true in the medium run but
not necessarily so in the short run, particularly in the face of
ongoing trade liberalization reforms.
Trade liberalization reforms, as instrumented in the
adjustment programs rely mainly on two mechanisms: export
13promotion and import liberalization. These two mechanisms are,
however, but two faces of the same coin. If the Trade Surplus,
the difference between exports and imports, is determined by
macroeconomic factors, any price incentives given to the
expansion of imports must result in more imports and more
exports. Similarly, incentives to export expansicn, if successful
must imply that imports have also increased in a proportional
amount.
The simple fact that unless income and absorption are
varied, imports and exports will tend to move together has been
systematically ignored by development strategies that relied on
import substitution as a way to solve developing countries
chronic shortages of foreign exchange. Perhaps the best example
of this type of policy is represented by the Argentine experience
during this century with import substitution. In 1920, when there
were little impediments to foreign trade, imports  were about
equal to exports and either represented about 37% of GDP. In
1975, after the process of import substitution  had been
completed, exports were again about equal to imports but now each
represented only 9.3% of GDP or about one fourth of what they
originally were. The end result of import substitution was not to
reduce the country's shortages of foreign exchange, as measured
by a tendency to generate trade deficits, but to reduce the level
of international trade as measured by either exports or imports.
Since import liberalization is the dual problem of import
substitution, it can be expected that the end result of the
import liberalization process should be an expansion in exports.
For that to happen, however, exporters must receive the adequate
price incentive in the form of a higher real exchange rate. The
raise in the real exchange rate in the face of import
liberalization is inevitable if the economy is to reach
macroeconomic equilibrium. Otherwise, imports  will increase and
the extra foreign exchange will have to come either from Reserves
or from capital inflows. In general, we cannot consider either
one of the above  as a permanent source of import financing. In
consequence, either the real exchange rate is allowed to increase
in the process of import liberalization or the economy will be
bound to a balance of payments crisis.
From the previous discussion we conclude that real exchange
rate adjustment is an essential element in a program of trade
liberalization. Such adjustment may be incorporated into the
program by means of the specification of required nominal
exchange rate adjustments or be left to be done by market fcrces.
In the later case, the nominal exchangs rate adjustment will be
quickly done if there is a freely floating foreign exchange
market. For practical purposes, however, we do not feel this case
14is likely to happen since the overwhelming  majority of Central
Banks in LDC's intervene into the determination of the price of
foreign exchange. In this last scenario, unless the real price of
foreign exchange is adjusted by authorities to what is needed by
the trade reform,  the adjustment may be long and costly in terms
of unemployed resources or unnecessary inflation and may lead to
short run macroeconomic imbalances that may induce the
abandonment of the reform program. Much can be gained, therefore,
by stipulating targets on both the path of the real
exchange rate as well as the rest of instruments  of the program.
Macroeconomic adjustments other than trade reform may also
require changes in the equilibrium  value of the real exchange
rate (this being defined as the internal relative price of
tradables vs.non-tradables). In particular, those changes that
require a new equilibrium level for the Trade Account. Any
macroeconomic action determining a change in the level of the
excess supply (or  demand) for tradable goods must be accompanied
by  a change in the relative price of those goods so that the
resources receive the correct price signal in order to shift
toward this sector. For example, an improvement in the fiscal
deficit is likely to free resources for them to move to the
traded sector. For this to happen, however, the relative price of
traded goods must increase,  which means that there is a new,
higher, equilibrium real exchange rate.
In Section III we will discuss the required real exchange
rate adjustment in much more detail as there are several problems
arising from the operational difficulties in measuring this
variable as well as specifying the required changes in the face
of adjustments in the wide variety of commercial policy
instruments that form part of a trade liberalization effort. We
shall also discuss in detail the required adjustments in the Real
Exchange Rate in the face of changes in aggregate levels of
income and expenditure of the country such as those that may
happen during an adjustment program aiming at a modification in
the level of the Trade Balance. In the Appendix we discuss some
additional issues involved in the choice of import substitution
vs. export promotion.
II.5  Fiscal Aspects of Structural Adjustment
Structural adjustment relies heavily on microeconomic
measures aimed at a better allocation of resources.Some of these
measures include reduction in levels of taxes or of controlled
prices. In some cases, the elimination of this restrictions to
resource allocation may have important effects on fiscal revenue
15and therefore contribute to the generation of macroeconomic
disequilibrium that may eventually put in danger the reform
itself.In those cases it is important that if a microeconomic
measure is to deprive the treasury from revenues, the program
mu.st  stipulate alternative fiscal  measures to deal with this
problem. Either expenditures will have to be cut elsewhere or
some other form of financing should be incorporated into the
program.
The general tenor here is the same stated in the introduction: a
structural reform is made ;o last for many years, and this will
only happen if it includes all the supporting measures for it to
be financially  viable. To reduce export taxes when export prices
have fallen is easy to implement as the government would have
done so anyway. The problem is to establish credible conditions
in the adjustment program so that the same government does not
rise the taxes when export prices go back up again. We will now
discuss some cases we consider relevant in the sense of being
microeconomic measures that have a fiscal impact that, if not
addressed, may contribute to the generation of macroeconomic
disequilibria.
(a)  Fiscal Aspects of Financial Reform
Several adjustment  programs aim at a better allocation of
resources in the financial and banking sectors. Aside from
specific microeconomic adjustments, one key element present in
several of this programs has been the need of greater flexibility
in the process of determination of interest rates. A common
problem found in LDC' is that interest rates tend to be subject
to government control, a situation that in some cases leads to
negative real interest rates and the subsequent need to ration
the small amount of credit available among the large demand for
it.
The control of interest rates has important macroeconomic
implications specially in high inflation countries where the
interest rate tends to be considered as an element contributing
to the rise in prices. Nominal interest rates tend to be
controlled at levels that produce substantially low real rates
and as a consequence the supply of funds to the institutionalized
system is drastically reduced. The resultant demonetization
restricts the supply of credit and produces the need to ration
it. As in any other rationing situation, the one doing the
rationing has a tendency to get the better part for himself. In
this case, with credit being rationed there is a tendency for the
government to get the better part of it. Credit rationing,
16therefore, induces an tendency for unduly increases in the level
of public debt as well as very stringent conditions for the
financing of private investment.
With the government debt already at high levels, the
liberalization of interest rates is likely to produce an
important fiscal imbalance. Sure enough, liberalization of the
interest rates will increase the rates in the institutionalized
sector but reduce them in the non-institutionalized  sector. The
problem is that government debt is usually placed in the
institutionalized sector. The fact must be faced that the
government was financing its expenditures through the equivalent
of a tax on the capital market and that liberalization has the
effect of eliminating that tax. Provisions must be made therefore
for alternative sources of revenue or for reductions in
expenditure. Lack of fiscal adjustment may imply that the
government will continue refinancing its existing debt at the now
positive real rates with the consequence of generating an
explosive situation in which internal real public debt starts
grow'ing  without bounds. Very soon we might find the whole of the
credit in the now free institutionalized system being devoted
totally to the financing of the government deficit.
One interesting alternative in the above problem is that if
passive (borrowing)  rates become positive in real terms, there
will be an increase in the demand for base money that usually
accompanies the resulting increase in monetization of the
economy.The alternative is open for the Central Bank to provide
the extra money demanded in exchange for outstanding public debt.
In this way, at least part of the fiscal problem created by the
high real interest cost on the public debt will be reduced as
there will be less debt outstanding.
(b) Fiscal Aspects of Trade Reform
Two key elements in Trade Reform have been the reduction of
import duties and of quantity controls whenever there is foreign
exchange rationing.Let us consider first the fiscal effects of
reducing import duties in the absence of foreign exchange
rationing.
Some countries use duties strictly for protective
purposes.In those countries one is likely to find very high, up
to the prohibitive level, duties on goods that have domestic
production (and there are very few imports of these goods) and
17very low or zero duties for imports  of goods not domestically
produced, mainly inputs and raw materials. In this case reduction
of the high duties is likely to result in more fiscal revenue as
it will also be the case if the low duties are increased. In this
case there are no obvious fiscal constraints working against a
move towards unification of duties at some intermediate level.
Different is the case in countries that rely heavily on
import duties as a source of fiscal revenue.These countries tend
to have a more uniform structure of tariff rates and any
reduction in the average tariff level is likely to generate some
significant fiscal imbalance.
Some countries also rely heavily on export taxes, mainly on
traditional exports. Moreover, these taxes are used normally
countercyclically, meaning that the tax is raised when the
foreign price increases therefore giving the producer the wrong
information as to in what direction to allocate his resources.
Export taxes are extremely damaging for resource
allocation, not only giving the wrong information to producers
but, by taxing value added, they induce the use of less variable
inputs, contributing to the technological backwardness of this
traditional sectors. Trade reform  programs often aim at the
reduction or elimination of export taxes but their implementation
is strongly opposed on fiscal  grounds.  As in the other cases
discussed above, therefore, it is fundamental that the reform
package include new fiscal alternatives to the duties or taxes
being reduced. Land taxes or economy  wide consumption taxes come
out as ideal alternatives.
A second problem comes about when there are import quotas or
foreign exchange rationing in operation. It may happen that the
adjustment program calls for tariff reductions on products that
are still subject to import quotas. If the import quota is not
increased, the domestic price should not change even in the face
of a lower tariff. In consequence,  what takes place is a shift in
tariff revenue from the Customs to the importer that is lucky
enough to hold the import quota.In this case, we have a tariff
reduction that produces a fiscal  problem and serves no purpose as
resource allocation is not improved.
(c)  Fiscal Aspects of Multiple Exchange Rates
Many countries use multiple exchange rates as an additional
form of taxing exports and subsidize the import competing sector.
18The advantages of this mechanism are exclusively political as
this measures do not normally require approval by Congress and
provide a flexible source of revenue to the Treasury. The rates
can also be easily modified by decision of the Central Bank. Form
an economic point of view, those advantages turn into
disadvantages. The first requisite for Commercial Policy
instruments is that they be stable over time and respond to an
agreed criteria for resource allocation.
Multiple exchange rates, however, are usually imposed as
short term forms of getting additional financing to the Treasury.
In doing so they violate the rule of stability of trade taxes and
also significantly obscure the functioning of the foreign
exchange market. Being subject to the discretional management of
Central Bank authorities they become an easy source of granting
of privileges and they quickly degenerate into a system of mixes
where the rate of each product is determined as a mix of the
different rates that exists. As the mixes are negotiated on a
case by case basis, the system leads towards a situation in which
each producer gets the rate that precisely eliminates foreign
competition. In essence, the Central Bank ends up instrumenting a
system of made to measure tariffs and export subsidies and taxes
that brinqs the economy closer to autarky.
In unifying exchange rates, care must be taken about the net
revenues that the multiple rates may be producing to the Central
Bank. Normally, the Central Bank tends to buy cheap from
traditional exporters and sell more expensive to importers. If
the rates are unified, the revenue from operation in foreign
exchange will disappear and additional sources of revenue must be
designed into the program.
II.6 Macroeconomic Policies and Economic Growtnt
One of the main purposes of structural adjustment is  0o
create conditions favorable to the attainment of a high and
sustainable rate of growth.  As we have seen, macroeconomic
stability is as an essential ingredient for adjustment to be
successful and therefore it is a contributing factor to growth.
It is also the case that it is  very difficult for growth to take
place in the presence of an unstable macroeconomic environment.
In other words, the set of policies we have described as
contributing to a sta'le macroeconomic environment is also
required for growth to take place.
19In general terms, we do not recommend the use of specific
macroeconomic policies for promoting growth to the extent that
these may interfere with efficient resource allocation.  More
specifically, we feel that given a stable macroeconomic
environment and the correct microeconomic incentives, resources
will be allocated to their most productive use without need for
additional macroeconomic incentives, such as subsidized credit or
an arbitrarily high real exchange rate.
It is the case, however, that government spending may crowd
out private spending, and investment in particular, unless it is
fully financed abroad. This fact is not enough to make a case
against any government spending that will be done at the expense
of private investment as the productivity of the former may be
higher than that of the later. This will certainly be the case of
government spending aimed at providing the basic infrastructure
needed for markets to operate. For other types of spending we can
only  recommend a careful evaluation and comparison of social
rates of return both of the new activities as well as of the
displaced activities.
We are aware that permanent evaluation on all types of
government investments is quite difficult to obtain and that
investment is also crowded out by current government spending. In
those circumstances, real interest rates may provide some
indication of the actual degree of crowding out in the capital
markets due to government spending, at least in the case when it
is debt financed. It is the case that excessive borrowing on the
part of the public sector is likely to produce real interest
rates in excess of the productivity of capital. In this case
growth is bound to suffer as investments are curtailed. As a
general rule to avoid this situation we recommend that ceilings
be imposed on rates of government borrowing. Unless a special
case is made for the higher productivity of public investment to
be financed by the incremental  borrowing, we suggest that
government borrowing as a fraction of total savings should not
exceed the share of government in the generation of GDP.
Other macroeconomic instruments  that are often present  in
the discussion of growth oriented policies are tha real interest
rates and the real exchange rate. Both are endogenous variables
and we do not recommend policies aiming at keeping them away from
their equilibrium values, even for the purposes of fostering
growth. For example, growth is best served by a well functioning
capital market and this is best obtained when govrernments  do not
try to interfere by controlling interest rates at below than
equilibrium levels.
20It is also the case that there cannot be investment without
savings, be they domestic or foreign. A well functioning
financial system is the best way to promote domestic savings, and
in this context we feel that a stable inflation rate, freedom of
determination of interest rates and convertibility of the
currency are essential ingredients  to this end.
21III.THE  REAL EXCHANGE  RATE
III.1-The Theoretical Background
We have already sean that the Real Exchange Rate is a key
macroeconomic variable in the process of structural adjustment.
There is however, no uniformly agreed definition of what the real
exchange rate is, nor on what is the process generating the
equilibrium level for this elusive variable.
Theoretical models (in  the Salter tradition) define the
real exchange rate as the relative price between traded and non-
traded goods. This type of measure is appropriate for defining
the relative price that tends to equilibrate the market for non-
traded goods, therefore allowing the economy to attain internal
balance without inflationary or deflationary  pressures. Other
measures, however, attempt to capture some indication of the
evolution of foreign versus domestic prices or costs.  The idea
behind this last type of measures being that, if over a period
prices in domestic currency have risen faster than foreign
prices, a devaluation is called for in order to restore
international competitiveness.
It is not clear what is the justification for the latter
type of measure. Apparently, the basic idea would be that all
prices in domestic currency can get out of line with foreign
prices when converted at the prevailing nominal exchange rate. In
this type of scenario, arbitrage in the markets for
internationally traded goods would not exist. In other words,
this measurement assumes that there is no automatic mechanism for
obtaining Purchasing Power Parity at the level of traded goods
and 'hat the nominal exchange rate should be adjusted in order
for PPP to be attained. If this is the case, however, it is
difficult to see how a single variable, the nominal exchange
rate, can be used to restore parity between the several thousand
of international traded goods that enter into a country's trade.
The most that could be done is to attain some type of "average
PPP"  between broadly defined categories of goods.
From a fundamental  point of view, we can say that if PPP does
not hold it may be because there are quantitative distortions in
the several markets comprising the traded sector.  Under these
circumstances, it is not clear whether the nominal exchange rate
that would yield some degree of "average PPP" would also be the
22one being consistent with internal balance and an optimal
allocation of resources. The problem, therefore, is one of too
many targets and only one instrument, the nominal exchange rate.
If there are quantity restrictions to international trade,
the proper policy assignment should be to eliminate those
restrictions whenever possible. If they cannot be eliminated,
optimum resource allocation requires that the goods subject to
those restrictions should have internal  prices different from the
international  prices in order to reflect the additional scarcity
or abundance value implied by the binding quantity restriction.
Attempts to use the nominal exchange rate in order to make the
internal prices of some goods more similar to their international
prices would do so in detriment of resource allocation and
welfare.
Another source of deviation from PPP may be the existence of
time lags in the actual process of conducting international
trade. Increases in the domestic price of import competing goods
may not be associated with an immediate flow of imports bringing
the price back to PPP.  This effect is at the heart of the "price-
specie flow" adjustment mechanism described by David Hume. In
Hume's view, price differentials are the main signals for trade
flows that redistribute money supplies and eventually lead back
to PPP. In this context, a devaluation in the country that has
the excess supply of money will restore equilibrium by
convalidating the higher domestic prices without need for trade
flows to take place.
In Hume's model all prices of goods, traded and non-traded,
would be above long run equilibrium given an increase in the
money supply and an unchanged exchange rate, the reason being
that there is an excess supply of money in the economy that is
immediately eliminated through an increase in prices. In this
context, the proper policy would be to devalue in proportion to
the excess supply of money and the price differential is
precisely capturing this magnitude. If,however, adjustment to PPP
is fast while financial markets adjust slowly, a comparison of
price indexes at a point in time will not  give an indication of
the correct amount of devaluation needed.
To illustrate the above point consider the extreme example
based on the adjustment mechanism of "income-absorption" of
Alexander or the more general "income-expenditure"  that
constitutes the basis of the adjustment process under the
"monetary approach to the balance of payments".  Assume a
situation where all goods are traded and there is instantaneous
23PPP. Assume the quantity of local money is doubled and that the
public plans to spend 1/10 of the excess supply per unit of time.
This will lead to a trajectory of trade deficits lasting until
reserves are depleted to that level that restores the money
supply to the original level. At no moment a comparison of price
indexes will give any hint that there is a potential need for a
devaluation, as domestic prices will remain always in  line with
international prices.
In the last two examples, there was need for a corrective
devaluation but only in one of them did the international price
comparison provide the right orientation. In both cases, however,
there was a trade deficit unwanted by the auchorities. The trade
deficit, in turn, was the counterpart of the excess supply of
money.
The analysis gets more complicated  when we allow for non-
traded goods and incorporate  the Salter measure of the relative
price of traded vs.non-traded goods into the picture.  A change
in the composition of expenditure within the country may require
a  change in the relative price of traded versus non-traded goods
in order to restore equilibrium. This may be achieved by means of
a  change in the nominal exchange rate and an accommodating
adjustment in the level of the nominal quantity of money, or,
alternatively, by just allowing the nominal price of non-traded
goods to find its new equilibrium level. In this last case, if
authorities devalue in proportion to international differences in
aggregate priceB  indexes, they may be induced to devalue whenever
an expenditure shift requires an increase in the relative price
of  non-traded goods. In doing so, authorities will in effect be
preventing the relative price adjustment to take place and
contributing to market disequilibrium.
From a practical point of view, we feel the most likely case
when PPP does not hold is when there are quantity constraints. In
that case we have seen that there is no argument for exchange
rate correction as the deviation from PPP should reflect the
scarcity or abundance of the different goods created by the QR's.
We are therefore left with two cases of need for nominal exchange
rate adjustment  (1)  global excess demand for goods in response
to excess supply of money that will only be partially reflected
in a comparison of global price indexes; (2)  changes in the
relative price of traded vs.non-traded goods due to expenditure
switching.
In either case we do not think there is a quantitative measure
of a real exchange rate such that keeping its level constant can
24be the objective for the nominal exchange rate policy.
As we have seen, the real exchange rate, defined as the
relative price of traded vs.nontraded goods, changes in response
to variations in the level of expenditures relative to income or
in response to expenditures switching among categories of goods.
The  objective of nominal exchange rate policy should be to
anticipate those changes and implement them through variations in
the nominal exchange rate rather than allowing costly variations
in the level of non-traded goods prices. In order to do so we
need a model for the determination of the equilibrium level of
the real exchange rate allowing to identify the required changes
in this variable.
A  second related problem is that of obtaining a practical
definition, for policy ?urposes, of the real exchange rate.This
implies obtaining meaningful series for the prices of traded and
non-traded goods so that the real exchange rate series so
constructed can be predicted from the theoretical model and at
the same time its construction is not subject to undue lags due
to data collection or arbitrariety due to the lack of a precise
definition about what time series are to be used for the
construction.
In Section III.2  we develop a simple general equilibrium
model that indicates what should be expected from a  Real Exchange
Rate measure for it to be useful for policy purposes and what are
the factors determining its equilibrium level.
25III.2 A Model Determining the Real Exchange Rate
Consider an economy producing three types of goods:
Exportable(E), Import Competing(I) and Non-Traded(N), whose
prices in domestic currency are, respectively: Pe ,  Pi ,  and Ph.
Equilibrium in the market for Traded Goods (the E and I goods)
requires that the excess supply of these goods  (the  Trade Balance
Surplus) be equal to the excess demand for foreign assets (the
Capital Account deficit plus changes in International Reserves)
plus the payments on Foreign Factor Services (the Service Account
deficit). We can see that the Current Account and the Trads
Account are directly related to the Service and Accumulation of
Foreign Assets and as such they must be determined by those
variables that affect that fraction of national savings oriented
towards foreign assets. We will come back to those factors in the
next Section.
Equilibrium in the market for Non-Traded goods requires that
their supply be equal to their demand. Their nominal price, Ph is
the natural variable through wh.ich  this equilibrium is attained.
However, a change in the nominal price of the NTG can also be
interpreted as a change in the relative price of the NTG in terms
of the Traded Goods. Here is were the concept of the Real
Exchange Rate appears. To define it, we need first to define an
appropriate index of prices of Traded Goods (Pt). In order to do
so let us look in more detail into the determination of
equilibrium in the market for the Non-Traded Good.
The supply of the NTG can be represented as a function of the
three nominal prices and nominal GDP:
(1)  Qh = Qh( Px ,  Pi , Ph ,  GDP)
The above function must be homogeneous of degree zero in all
nominal variables since a proportional increase in all nominal
prices and GDP would leave real quantities, and Qh, unaltered.
This means we can divide all arguments in the right hand side of
(1)  by any number (different  from zero) without any significant
change taking place. Choosing Ph as the common deflator we
obtain:
(2)  Qh =  Qh  (Px/Ph  ,  Pi/Ph  ,  GDP/Ph)
26Let us assume that the share of output of Qh in GDP depends
only on relative prices. This implies the following form for (2):
(3)  Qh =  qh[Px/Ph,Pi/Ph]*(GDP/Ph)
In (3), qht.] represents the share of Qh in GDP. It depends on
the relative price of E in terms of H and on the relative price
of I in terms of H.  The real exchange rate is supposed  to be
the relative price of both traded goods in terms of H, whereas,
in (3)  we see that what really matters is the relative price of
each traded good in terms of H. In general, we can affirm that
the Real Exchange Rate concept lacks meaning unless the relative
price of the two traded goods (the  Terms of Trade,corrected for
taxes or subsidies) is taken into account.
Consider an arbitrary price index of che domestic currency
price of the two traded goods :
(4)  Pt= F( Pe ,  Pi ),  homogeneous of degree 1 in both
arguments, so that it can be represented by:
(5)  Pt =  Pi*f(Pe/Pi)= Pi*f(T),  where T=Pe/Pi is the terms of
trade measured by internal prices (therefore  incorporating
whatever measures of commercial policy that makes them differ
from international prices).
Going back to (3),  we can divide and multiply each of the
relative prices in this expression by Pt and obtain:
(6)  Qh =  qh [  (Pi/Ph)*Pt/Pi*f(T) ,  (Pe/Ph)*Pt/Pi*f(T) ]*(GDP/Ph)
Denote the Real Exchange Rate as :
(7)  e =  Pt/Ph
Substituting (7) into (6) and rearranging terms:
(8)  Qh =  qh t  e/f(T) ,  e*T/f(T) ]*(GDP/Ph)
27Or, in more general terms:
(9)  Qh =  qh( e, T)*(GDP/Ph).
In general one would expect a non-positive sign on the
effect of e on Qh and an ambiguous sign with respect to T. This
should not bother us since those signs will be empirically tested
later in this Section.
The treatment of the Demand side is similar  to that of the
supply, except that demand for the Non-Traded Good (Ch) should
not depend on GDP, that is the value of domestic production of
goods, but on Absorption, that is the value of domestic
expenditure on goods. Denoting absorption by A, we can express
the demand for Ch as:
(10)  Ch =  ch( e ,  T )*(A/ph)
We finally use the basic national accounts relationship, that
gives rise to Alexander's Absorption Approach:
(11)  GDP =  A +  TS  ,where  TS is the Trade Surplus.
Market equilibrium requires the equality of Qh and Ch:
(12)  Qh =  Ch
Substituting (9),(10)  and (11) into (12)  we obtain:
(13)  qh(e,T)*(GDP/Ph)= ch(e,T)*(GDP-TS)/Ph
Finally, denominating ts= TS/GDP to the ratio of the Trade
Surplus to GDP, we obtain:
(14)  qh(e,T)= ch(e,T)*(1-ts).
28The above expression show.i  the relationship required for market
equilibrium between the Real Exchange Rate, the Terms of Trade
and the Trade Surplus(normalized by GDP). In explicit form, this
expression implies a functional relation between e and T and ts:
(15)  e =  e( T  ,  ts).
In general one would expect that a higher Trade Surplus will
require a higher Real Exchange Rate. The relation between T and e
is ambiguous not only on theoretical grounds (depending on
relations of substitution or complamentarity between goods) but
also because of the arbitrary index of prices of traded goods we
have chosen.
Equation (15) tells us that for any arbitrary index Pt there
is a relation between the Real Exchange Rate constructed using
that index and the Trade Surplus. The shape, and even the sign of
this relation, however, may change depending on the index being
used.
In practice, the problem of constructing the Real Exchange
Rate is more complex than what we have seen so far. In fact,
there is no such clear classification of three goods in the real
world and therefore the criteria for aggregation is left in the
hands of the one constructing the index.  This is not a trivial
problem. In general, the numerator of the Real Exchange Rate
includes the Nominal Exchange Rate and some aggregate of
international prices. In many countries,monetary  authorities use
the level of the Real Exchange Rate as a way to obtain indication
of what the nominal exchange rate should be. This implies tha;
they devalue in proportion to the difference between the rate of
change in the index of international  prices they use and a
measure of Non-Traded goods prices . Therefore, the election of
the basket of international prices and of the domestic prices
representative of non-traded goods is of crucial importance.
In an economy where authorities follow a crawling peg policy
based on some RER concept there are two problems:
(  a )  Constructing a meaningful aggregate for the Real Exchange
Rate. By meaningfull we mean that this aggregate must have some
relationship with the Terms of Trade and the Trade Balance.
choosing to stabilize the relative price of Newsweek Magazine
(Traded) in terms of Taxi Fares (Non-Traded)  may easy the problem
of constructing a more comprehensive Real Exchange Rate but
certainly it will be a very long time before the stabilization of
29this relative price is able to generate Home Goods Market
equilibrium; in tLa meantime the Nominal Exchange Rate may take
absurd values given conditions prevailing in the rest of the
economy. We propose that for crawling peg purposes, the Real
Exchange Rate must be empirically related to the Terms of Trade
and the Trade Balance, as the theoretical relation (15)
indicates. In practice this implies choosing the Real Exchange
Rate concept that shows the best statistical fit between itself
and T and ts.
(  b )  Assuming one finds the proper measure of the Real
Exchange Rate one has now the problem of finding the equilibrium
value, to the maintenance of which the Nominal Exchange Rate
policy will be oriented through the crawl.  It is usual practice
to  choose one particular level (say 112) for the Real Exchange
Rate being measured and manage the nominal rate in order to keep
that Real Exchange Rate constant through time at the chosen
level.
We suggest that the equilibrium value of the Real Exchange
Rate should be the value predicted by the empirical estimation of
equation (15). Since both T and ts are bound to change through
time, the equilibrium value of the Real Exchange Rate will also
change. This implies that the target level of the crawling peg
should not be a fixed level of the Real Exchange Rate but it
should follow its equilibrium value,a value that may change
through time. Changes in the Terms of Trade or in the level of
the Trade Account should demand corrective changes in the Nominal
Exchange Rate if the objective of the crawl is to keep the Real
Exchange Rate in equilibrium without need for the adjustment to
take place through changes in Non-Traded goods prices.
III.3  Empirical Analysis
In what follows we will try to illustrate the problems
involved with the measurement and the estimation of the
equilibrium level of the real exchange rate. We do not intend
here to provide an extensive empirical analysis on what the
correct measure of the real exchange rate should be or what
should be the precise empirical form of the structural equation
determining its equilibrium value. Rather, we have chosen to
illustrate with the help of data from a few countries what are
the main problems to be encountered.  Those problems can be
divided into two: those related to the prices to be used in the
construction of the Real Exchange Rate and those related to the
determination of the equilibrium value for th' variable so
constructed.
30Basically, there are two competing measures of Real
Exchange Rates. They differ on the series used to represent the
prices of traded goods. One uses a weighted sum of partner
country's price indexes converted into the domestic currency by
means of the bilateral exchange rates.  This number is then
deflated by the home country CPI in order to get the Real
Exchange Rate. We denote this version as the CPI Basket Real
Exchange Rate(CPIB). This measure is constructed by most
country's monetary authorities and is widely used  as indicator
for the design of nominal exchange rate policy. The weights used
are generally the shares of each country in the home country's
trade in a base year.
The second measure tries to capture directly the domestic
currency prices of the goods that are actually traded by the home
country. One way of doing it is by obtaining the dollar prices of
those goods and multiplying them by the exchange rate between the
domestic currency and the dollar. The different foreign traded
goods  prices are then aggregated by use of weights representing
the share of each product in the country's trade. This measure is
imperfect as it ignores the effect on domestic prices of traded
goods of commercial policy. The alternative is to use series of
domestiuc currency prices of traded goods.
The following hypothetical example will help in identifying
the fundamental differences between both measures. Assume
Argentina exports all of its wheat to Uganda.  Also assume
Argentina is pegged to the dollar and that Uganda's currency
floats vis a vis the dollar. Assume the dollar experiences a
devaluation versus the currency of Uganda and that at the same
time the dollar price of wheat falls in dollar terms. Since
Argentina pegs to the dollar, its currency has devalued against
Uganda's currency. Therefore, the cost of living in Uganda
measured in Argentine Australes has risen. The CPI basket measure
of the Real Exchange Rate of Argentina must have risen, implying
a real devaluation. However, it turns out that the price of wheat
is not determined in Uganda but in the world market and we have
assumed it fell in dollars. This means that the Real Exchange
Rate using the actual prices of traded goods must have fallen,
implying a real appreciation.  In this particular example, both
measures of the Real Exchange Rate change in the opposite
direction. If Argentina were to index its nominal exchange rate
to mantain some level of the Real Exchange Rate, it would have to
revalue if it used the CPI Basket version or devalue if it used
the Traded Goods Prices version(TGP).
31The above example is not unrealistic. In the last few years
the dollar cost of living of Argentina's rain trading partners
has significantly risen as a consequence of the U.S. dollar
devaluation.  However, during these same years, the dollar prices
of the commodities Argentina exports and imports have fallen in
nominal terms when measured in dollars. For this particular
situation, if the objective were to be that of maintaining
constant the price of home goods, the argentine currency should
have been devalued versus the dollar as recommended by the Real
Exchange Rate measure using actual traded goods prices. The Real
Exchange Rate using baskets of CPI's would have wrongly
recommended revaluation of the currency
The experience of Argentina is not different from that of
many other countries. The fact is that the sharp movements in the
value of the dollar were not accompanied  by movements in the
opposite direction in dollar prices of internationally traded
goods. This is particularly the case for those countries trading
mainly in commodities.  Between 1983 and 1986, the dollar prices
of commodities, measured by the IMF Index of Commodity Prices,
has moved in the same direction as the value of the U.S.Dollar,
measured by the MIRM Effective Exchange Rate for the Dollar. This
fact can be clearly appreciated in Figure 1.
32FIGURE  III.1
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The U.S.A. is no exemption to the points made
above. Although the dollar devaluations helped a lot in making
tourism more expensive for americans,this being measured by the
weighted sum of CPI's converted into dollars, it was not so much
successful in increasing the dollar prices of U.S. traded goods.
Figure 2 shows the two measures of international  prices we have
been discussing:the CPI's weighted basket(obtained from IMF
Information Notice System) and the index of USA traded goods
prices  (constructed  as  a  logarithmic  index  of  USA unit  exports
and  imports  values  with  equal  weights).
33FIGURE  III.2
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(Bs34eMIt can be seen in Figure 2 that since around 1981, the basket
of CPI's measure starts diverging significantly from the index of
traded goods prices for the U.S..The question is therefore which
measure should be used to construct the U.S. Real Exchange Rate.
Figure 3 shows the alternative measures, using the U.S. CPI as
the deflator. The CPI's Basket measure is represented by the
series constructed by the IMF Information  Notice System ,  and is
denoted as the INS Real Exchange Rate. The Real Exchange Rate
using the export and import unit values is denoted by PT/PN .
Since it is obvious that both measures of the RER move very
differently, the question of which one would be relevant for
policy purposes requires additional analysis in order to be
answered.
In the particular case of the U.S. there is an additional
problem relating the usefulness of the Real Exchange Rate measure
for policy purposes. This arises because the U.S. is an important
price setter in the market for traded goods. Therefore, we should
not expect an immediate response form traded goods prices
measured in dollars derived from a change in the value of the
dollar in terms of other currencies. In fact, we may not even
expect PPP to prevail as strongly as it would in the case of a
smaller country. The 1986-87 experience shows that the
substantial dollar devaluation failed in increasing the dollar
prices of U.S.traded goods. Worse than that, the dollar
devaluation apparently also failed in reducing the foreign
currency prices of the goods traded by the U.S.. In consequence,
PPP must not have held during this period. There is evidence,
however, that prices are slowly converging to PPP, but the
problem  remains  of whether  the U.S.,  by nominal  devaluations  can
affect the level of the relevant real exchange rate within a time
frame useful for policy purposes.
For most other small open economies, the U.S. problem does
not arise as changes in the value of the domestic currency in
terms of foreign exchange are quickly reflected in the domestic
currency price of traded goods.
35Preliminary Empirical Evidence
We have seen above that the Real Exchange Rate should be
related  to  the  Trade  Surplus  and  the  Terms  of  Trade  in  order  to
guarantee  equilibrium  in  the  market  for  non-traded  goods.
Figures  4  and  5  show  the  plots  of the two RER measures against
the  ratio  of  the  U.S.Trade  Surplus  to GDP. It is quite evident
than in the period covered, the measure using the basket of CPI's
(the  INS Rate) has no evident relation to the trade surplus.  The
measure using actual traded goods prices, however, shows clear
signs of being positively related to the Trade Surplus.
FIGURE III.4
PLOT  OF  TSP  A  ItS REAL  DXCH.RATE
(QUqTERLY  1975.1  1987.3)
-2 
A  1 I~~~~~~  a
ii  o
a4  0 a
-2  0  a  a  a  o
-3  oo~~~~~3
a~o  o  °  o 
SO  ~~~~~~~118  139S
36FIGURE III.5
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As mentioned  in the  theoretical  analysis,  one  should  expect  a
positive  relationship  between  the RER  and the  ratio  of the Trade
S.urplus  to GDP  while  the  sign  of the relation  with  the Terms  of
Trade  could  not  be determined  a Priori.
the  results  of the  empirical  fit of equation  (15) for
Argentina,  Colombia  and  the  U.S.A.  are  reported  in Table  1.  Since
the Trade  Surplus  is also an endogenous  variable,  Two  Stages
Least  Squares  estimation  was used  in order  to correct  for the
simultaneous  determination  of the  Real Exchange  Rate  and the
Trade  Balance.In  the  case of U.S.A.  also the  terms  of trade  were
considered  to be simultaneously  determined.  Among  the
instrumental  variables  used was  the ratio  of the Fiscal  Surplus
to GDP,  since  this variable  is expected  to have  an  impact  on the
Trade  Surplus.
It can be clearly  appreciated  from Table  1 that the  PT/PN
measure  yields  a substantially  better  fit than  the  Basket  rate  in
two of the three  countries,  Colombia  and U.S.A..  All  regressions
have  been  corrected  for  first  order  autocorrelation,  given  by the
AR(l)  coefficient  whenever  this procedure  was  deemed  required.
37The  information  of Tables  1 and  2 provides  some  evidence  in
favor  of using  actual  traded  goods  prices  instead  of a basket  of
price  levels  as measure  of traded  goods  prices.  Some additional
studies  are however,  called  for, as one  of the  three  cases,
Argentina,  does  not  support  this view  ,  at least  for  the period
under  analysis.  For  the two  other  countries,  the measure  using
actual  prices  of traded  goods  performs  substantially  better  than
the  Basket  measure.
TABLE  1
EXPLANATORY REGRESSION  FOR  THE  REAL  EXCHANGE RATE
USING  A BASKET  OF CURRENCIES
U.S.A.  COLOMBIA  ARGENTINA
Constant  11.61  4.441  4.32
(T-Value)  (1.5)  (180)  (42)
Log(Terms  of Trade)  -1.602  -0.381  -0.21
(T-Value)  (-0.97)  (-2.35)  (-0.8)
Trade  Surplus/GDP  -0.047  0.041  0.054
(T-Value)  (_0.C)  (3^73)  (3.16)
AR(1)  0.936  0.655
(T-Value)  (16.4)  - (3.55)
_____________________________
R2 Adj.  0.81  0.37  0.84
S.E.of  Regression  0.055  0.08  0.13
D.W.  1.23  1.26  1.62
PERIOD  75.IV-  1971-  1972-
85-III  1986  1987
INSTRUMENTAL  VARIABLES:
Log.T.of  Trade  (0,-i),Fiscal  Surplus/GDP  (0,-l),Trade  S./GDP(-1)
Real  Exch.Rate(-1).  The USA  regression  is done with  quarterly
data  seasonally  adjusted  at annual  rates  and  does not  include  the
current  terms  cf trade  as instrumental  variable.
The  Terms  of Trade  variable  corresponds  to the  ratio  of internal
prices  of exports  and  imports.
38TABLE  2
EXPLANATORY  REGRESSION  FOR THE REAL  EXCHANGE  RATE USING
ACTUAL  TRADED  GOODS  PRICES
U.S.A.  COLOMBIA  ARGENTINA
Constant  4.71  4.558  4.649
(T-Value)  (0.64)  (170)  (49.3)
Log(Terms  of Trade)  -0.022  0.139  0.006
(T-Value)  (-0.01)  (0.79)  (0.03)
Trade  Surplus/GDP  0.052  0.0445  0.042
(T-Value)  (3.69)  (3.77)  (2.02)
AR(1)  0.773  0.600
(T-Value)  (1.53)  - (2.26)
_____________________________
R2 Adj.  0.91  0.71  0.50
S.E.of  Regression  0.023  0.091  0.14
D.W.  2.13  1.39  1.61
INSTRUMENTAL  VARIABLES:
Log.T.of  Trade  (0,-i),Fiscal  Surplus/GDP  (0,-l),Trade  S./GDP(-I)
Real  Exch.Rate(-1).  The USA  regression  is done  with  quarterly
data  seasonally  adjusted  at annual  rates  and does  not  include  the
current  terms  of trade  as instrumental  variable.
39As indicated previously, we should not expect any definite
sign for the coefficient on the terms of trade as it would depend
heavily in the kind of weights used in the aggregation for
constructing the real exchange rate measure. For five of the six
regressions we carried out, the coefficient on the the terms of
trade comes out statistically insignificant. This is not a
welcome result if we want the regression to tell something about
the effects of commercial policy on the exchange rate.This defect
will be corrected later using as different aggregation.
It is surprising the values taken by the estimated
coefficients on the ratio of the Trade Surplus to GDP. This
coefficient comes significant in five out of the six cases. In
all those five cases, it value ranges between 0.40 and 0.53.
Since we are dealing with three different countries, this
coincidence is surprising and deserves further work to see how
much it does generalize to other countries and time periods.
Taking an average of 0.45, the estimated value for the
coefficient means that a permanent increase in the Trade Surplus
of ]%  of GDP requires a 4.5% increase in the equilibrium level of
the Real Exchange Rate (  at least in the two types of measures we
have constructed). The stability and similarity of this
coefficient across countries proves encouraging as it provides an
extremely useful link between two key macroeconomic variables
that are usually at the core of structural adjustment programs.
The story is incomplete, however, as we still have to find out
the fundamentals behind the determination of the Trade Surplus.
III.4  Real Exchange Rate and Commercial Policy
In the empirical analysis conducted above we failed to find
any significant relation between our different measures of the
Real Exchange Rate and the Internal Terms of Trade, that in turn
are determined by Commercial Policy and external prices. This may
be taken to imply that changes in the external terms of trade or
in taxes or subsidies on trade may not require appropriate
changes in nominal exchange rate policy as the real exchange rate
is apparently independent from them. We do know, however, that on
a theoretical basis we should not expect such extreme
independence to hold. We are therefore inclined to think that the
aggregation used to construct our two measures of Real Exchange
Rate biased the estimation in favor of producing a statistically
insignificant coefficient.
40The basic problem is that the Real Exchange Rate intends to
be an aggregate of the average price of traded goods in terms of
non-traded goods. It is well known that such an average fails to
perform when there are changes in the relative prices of the
products used to construct it. If the relative price between
exports and imports change, the concept of price of traded goods
loses operational sense. In that case one should properly
identify at least two real exchange rates: one for exports and
one for imports. This point was clearly discussed in Section II
when  discussing the effects of import liberalization.
We can easily modify our presentation here to explicitly
incorporate an export and an import real exchange rate. This
requires normalising eqn.(1) by either price of traded goods
instead of an average of both. In this case, the final
equilibrium condition in  the market for non-traded goods becomes:
(16)  Qh(  Px/Ph  ,  Px/Pm)  =  Ch(  Px/Ph,  Px/Pm).  (l-ts)
What eqn.(16) is showing is that the price of the home good,
Ph, is determined by the prices of the two other goods, Px and Pm
and the level of excess demand in the economy (-ts).  Solving
explicitly in terms of rates of change, we can express the
changes in Ph required to attain equilibrium in the market for
non-traded goods as:
(17)  DPh/Ph  =  w.DPmi/Pm +  (l-w).DPx/Px  - z.Dts  ,  (Dx= dx/dt)
where w is the elasticity of Ph w.r.t. the domestic price of
imports (presumed  positive and less than unity in absolute value)
and z is the semilog elasticity of Ph with respect to the trade
surplus (normalized  by GDP).
In turn, the changes in Px and Pm can be divided in three
sources: exchange rate, foreign prices and trade taxes:
(18) DPx/Px  =  DE/E +DP*x/P*x  - Sx
(19) DPm/Pm  =  DE/E  + DP*m/P*m  + Tm
41Substituting (18) and (19) into (17)  we obtain:
(20)  DE/E  - DPh/Ph  --  (w.(DP*m/P*m)  +  (l-w).(DP*x/P*x8)  -
- (w.Tm  +  (1-w).Sx) +  z.Dts
Given proper estimates for w and z, eqn.(20) tells the
required changes in the ratio E/Ph required to recover
equilibrium in the market for non-traded goods.
We have estimated the relation presented in (13)  using annual
data for Colombia for the period 1971-86. The results are as
follows:
Ln(Px/Ph) =  1.707  - 0.576.Ln(Pm/Px)  +  0.0452.(TS/GDP)




The estimation used TSLQ and the instruments where current
and lagged Pm/px, Government Deficit ,and lagged Trade Trade
Surplus to GDP ratio.
The first thing to note is the similarity of the coefficient
on (TS/GDP)  with those obtained in the regressions presented in
Tables III.1 and III.2.
The estimated value of w of 0.576 implies  that the reduction
of 10% points in import duties should be accompanied by a 5.76%
real devaluation, meaning that this is the amount that nominal
devaluation must exceed the price of home goods for equilibrium
to be restored. In this case, the real devaluation will be
obtained either by nominal devaluation, fall in Ph or any
combination between the two. In this case, our measure of Ph used
was the consumer price index; other measure of Ph will probably
yield a different value for w. If the measure of Ph used actually
has into it traded goods, the initial nominal devaluation of
5.76% will not be able to obtain the required real devaluation as
Ph(as measured) in itself will tend to increase by some fraction
of this amount. Because of this measurement problem, it is better
to specify the exchange rate adj1'scment  in relation to the price
index used as deflator in (20).
42We recommend that exchange rate policy in the face of
structural adjustment be based on the prediction of an equation
such as (20) proper'ly  estimated for the country in question. From
this perspective we have identified three main sources requiring
possible adjustments in the nominal exchange rate once deflated
by an appropriate index of non-traded goods prices: changes in
terms of trade, international inflation, commercial policy and
domestic absorption relative to GDP (measured  by the ratio
TS/GDP).
43IV. THE TRADE BALANCE
IV.1 Introduction
We have already established that the real exchange rate is
determined, among other variables, by the level of the Trade
Balance this being measured as the excess of output over
absorption of goods and services. In determining the level of the
Trade Surplus we have therefore to study the factors that affect
the difference between output and absorption.  Clearly, such a
difference is related to the desired rate of accumulation of
foreign assets of the country. From a practical point of view, we
can identify the following variables among the determining
factors of the Trade Surplus:
- Fiscal  Deficit
- Interest  rates,  domestic  and  foreign
- Terms  of Trade
- output  level
-Net income from (payments  to) foreign assets and level of
external assets  (debt)
It is very difficult to construct a general model of
determination of the Trade Balance, as the fundamental factors
determining it are likely to vary widely from country to country.
We will therefore try to concentrate on what we believe are some
of the most commonly observed factors in the process of
determination of the Trade Balance without implying by this that
our analysis has been exhaustive.
44IV.2 Trade Surplus Determination with Quantity Constraints
All of the above variables are directly linked to the
determination of the equilibrium level of domestic absorption.
We shall not attempt to explain quantitatively the determination
of the Trade Surplus in disequilibrium situations, as we cannot
imagine any general model for doing it. For example, trying to
quantify the effect on the Trade Surplus following the
liberalization of import duties while keeping constant the
nominal exchange rate may prove to be an impossible duty as
importers may try to anticipate imports in the face of the likely
increase in the real ex-hange rate that eventually should take
place, either through a future  devaluation or a fall in prices of
non-traded goods.
In general, if the real exchange rate is not allowed to take
its equilibrium level, predicting the Trade Surplus becomes a
difficult task, as its level  would certainly depend on the
rationing mechanisms used in order to allow the disequilibrium to
continue. Such would be the case of countries where the
authorities index the nominal exchange rate to the maintenance of
a fix level of some measure of the real exchange rate and in
addition use quantity constraints such as import quotas. In such
a  situation, the potential excess demand of the economy cannot
show up in a Trade Deficit but will rather appear as domestic
shortages and a black market premium for foreign exchange. In
that context, a real devaluation may boost exports without any
increase in imports and we may observe an improvement in the
Trade Surplus. The question is how long can that situation
continue. If the government is buying the extra foreign exchange
with genuine resources, the counterpart must be a fiscal surplus
and everything will fit in our conceptual equilibrium model  :  the
Trade Surplus could be predicted from the planned fiscal surplus.
If however, the foreign exchange is bought by printing
money, the internal disequilibrium will be aggravated: black
market premium will increase and there will be inflationary
pressures. Given the rate of acquisition of reserves, there will
be an associated rate of money creation and of the inflation tax.
What we have therefore is a situation in which the Central Bank
is imposing an inflation tax which proceeds are used for the
acquisition of foreign exchange.
The above is a particular form of the inflation tax as it
does not have the counterpart of a deficit in the non-financial
public sector. This is tax imposed and collected by the Central
Bank and used to accumulate Reserves or Gervice its foreign debt.
45In this situation, the best that can be done to _-cdict the Trade
Surplus is get some estimate of the export respon a to the real
devaluation and another estimate of how much will authorities
allow imports to increase.
In general, when there are import and capital controls, we
cannot specify a general rule for determining the trade surplus
as it will depend on the rationing mechanisms in use. But in such
cases, the equilibrium approach for determining the Real Exchange
Rate is also not valid. The real exchange Rate will be determined
by the monetary authorities through the indexing rule. The Trade
Surplus, in turn, will equal the amount of inflation tax
authorities want to use for the purchase of foreign exchange.
If a country is in a situation such as the one described
above, we feel that structural adjustment should start by
restoring the role of markets before even trying to adjust
anything else. Predicting what the Real Exchange Rate should be
if some import quotas are lifted may turn out to bu an impossible
task.  In that context, I feel that macroeconomic policy more
than specify target levels must specify the implementation of
market oriented rules.
For example, consider the case of an economy using import
quotas that are eventually to be lifted as part of a Trade Reform
program. In that case I would recommend the immediate lifting of
the quotas and its replacement  by the implementation of an import
budget to be auctioned among all importers. Luxury imports, in
the transition, may be discouraged by the imposition of
additional import duties. The import  exchange rate, therefore,
does not become a macroeconomic variable to be determined by the
program as it would be a market determined variable. The export
exchange rate, in turn, should  be moved, as circumstances permit,
towards the, presumably higher, level of the freely determined
import rate.
One may, however, wonder what is the reason for the foreign
exchange rationing. One may find here two main reasons related to
macroeconomic factors. First is the existence of a high fiscal
deficit that would imply a trade deficit not compatible with the
availability of foreign financing.
46Reluctance of authorities to reduce their deficit induces
them to look for internal sources of financing.  If those are not
found, they end up imposing import controls as a way to control
the otherwise  unavoidable trade deficit resulting from the
increased spending.
The  solution to this problem is to reduce the fiscal
deficit, or develop alternative  ways of internal financing and
allow the increase in the real exchange rate required to attain
market equilibrium.
The second reason may be that authorities are fearsome of the
income distribution effects of allowing a rise in either the
import or export exchange rates. In that case we feel the first
step should be exchange rate unification at the equilibrium level
and to duplicate the desired relative price structure through
trade taxes or subsidies. We do not feel that multiple exchange
rates and quantity controls should be used as substitute for
commercial policy instruments in the context of structural
adjustment programs. Here again we favor measures aiming at
market transparency as a first step in the design of structural
adjustment.
IV.3 Trade Surplus Determination  with Functioning  Markets
Given a reasonable degree of capital mobility and price
flexibility in foreign trade, the trade surplus should be readily
explained by the variables determining income and absorption to
which we made reference above.
Obtaining a general structural equation form for determining
the trade surplus exceeds the scope of this work and most likely
it would not prove to be successful as some variables will be
relevant in some countries and not in others. Furthermore, the
specific values of the coefficients will depend highly on the
situation in the country being analyzed, in particular the degree
of openness of the economy to goods and assets trade.
For illustrative purposes only, we include the following
regression explaining the Trade Surplus in Colombia using annual
data for the period 1970-86. The dependent variable is the ratio
of the Trade Surplus to GDP and the explanatory variables are
just two: the external terms of trade and the Fiscal Surplus to
GDP ratio. The results are as follows:
47(21)
TS/GDP  1.978 +  7.17 Ln(TofTrade) +  0.710 (Fiscal  Surplus/GDP)




The results of the above regression are exceptionally good
given the small number of explanatory variables involved. No
doubt they would be improved evern  more if additional variables
contributing to the explanation of absorption are included. Among
these we would like to include the variables related to the
degree of external debt: the level of the debt and its service:
we expect the level of the debt to increase the Trade
Surplus(because of its positive effect on savings) and its
service to increase the Surplus (because  of the reduction in
disposable income) proportionately.
IV.4 Effects of the Real Exchange Rate on the Trade Surplus
The theoretical approach we have followed so far indicated
that the Real Exchange Rate is the price that equilibrates the
market for domestic goods for any given level of excess demand in
the economy. From that perspective, the Real Exchange Rate is
determined by the Trade Surplus and not viceversa.  For example,
an increase in the fiscal deficit should generate a larger Trate
Deficit and this in turn would induce a real appreciation of the
exchange rate. We view the solution to the trade Deficit as
improving the Fiscal Deficit; once this is done, a real
devaluation is needed to restore market equilibrium.
The  causality relation established above is fundamental for
policy purposes as many policy recommendations are usually based
on implementing a real devaluation as a way to improve on the
Trade Deficit. If the real devaluation is not implemented
together with an expenditure reduction measure (like reducing the
Fiscal Deficit), the economy would not be in equilibrium and the
real devaluation will be hard to sustain in the face of unchanged
inflation tax (a  point already discussed above).
48The Colombian data confirms our presumption that when the
fundamontal determinants of the Trade Surplus are included, the
Real Exchange Rate does not add significantly to the explanatory
power of the regression. This point is shown in the following
regression were we have added the PT/PH version of the Real
Exchange rate as an additional explanatory  variable in (21).
(22)
TS/GDP= -19.8 +  4.81 Ln(TofT) +  0.57(Fiscal S./GDP) +4.68 Ln(RER)




The results show that the coefficient of the RER is not
significantly different from zero and that the coefficients of
the Fiscal Surplus and the Terms of Trade do not change their
values significantly.
In conclusion, the  Real Exchange Rate is as much an
endogenous variable as the Trade Surplus and therefore one nould
not use one to affect the other. The proper policy assignment to
improve the Trade Surplus is to reduce absorption relative to
income (i.e. through the fiscal deficit or other appropriate
exogenous variable) and then allow for the required real
devaluation that should accompany the improvement in the Trade
Surplus.
49IV.5 The Effects of Temporary versus Permanent Changes in the
Terms of Trade
An important policy question is what should be done to the
Real Exchange Rate in the presence of a temporary shock to the
terms of trade. This is particularly relevant for countries with
a little diversified export sector, a problem that seems common
among countries in need of structural adjustment.
Conventional economic theory suggests that a temporary
windfall in income should be saved and only gradually be spent
over time. In terms of foreign trade, this analysis suggests that
a temporary improvement in the terms of trade should be used to
accumulate foreign assets instead of devoting the extra foreign
exchange to immediately increase imports. This implies that the
improvement in the Trade Surplus should be larger when the
improvement in the terms of trade is temporarv rather than
permanent.
our analysis is again confirmed using the Colombian data. We
have opened up the terms of trade between a "predictable"
component and the deviation from it. The "predictable" trend was
obtained by an Arima(1,2) process. The results are shown in the
regression shown in Eqn.(23). As expected, the coefficient on the
temporary component of the terms of trade (DEV) is larger that
the coefficient on the predictable component (PRED).  This implies
that the trade surplus increases by more when the changes in the
terms of trade are above what can be considered normal.
(23)
TS/GDP  =  1.81 +  8.06  DEV +  6.55 PRED + 0.70  (Fiscal S./GDP)




Consider a 20% temporary increase in the terms of trade
(DEV=0.2).  This results in an increase in 1.61 % in the ratio
TS/GDP as compared with the increase of 1.31% if the change had
been permanent.
The fact that the terms of trade change can be temporary or
permanent will also have an effect on the required adjustment in
the level of the Real Exchange Rate. According to Eqn(20), an
50increase in export prices will have a direct impact on the
exchange rate in proportion to the parameter  -(l-w), if the
objective is to maintain equilibrium at an unchanged lavel  of Ph.
Therefore, the impact effect of an improvement in export prices
is to require a revaluation. There is a secondary effect,
however, through the change in the Trade Surplus induced by the
change in export prices. This effect calls for a devaluation in
proportion to the value of the parameter z times the improvement
in the TS/GDP ratio. The net effect on the exchange rate will
therefore be equal to the sum of both terms.
Substituting the relevant terms of Eqn(23) in Eqn(20) and
using the estimated values of z and w we obtain the following
relation between the required changes in the nominal exchange
rate in response to a change in export prices (temporary  or
permanent:
(24) dE/E =  -(1-0.576).(dP*x/P*x)  (Direct  impact effect)
+  0.0452.(8.06.DEV  +6.55.PRED) (Indirect  Effect due
to changes in TS/GDP)
If the change of 20% in P*x is temporary, the adjustment calls
for a revaluation 1.2%. If, instead, the 20% change was permanent,
adjustment requires a revaluation of 2.55%. Clearly our data
confirm that the real revaluation (relative  to Ph) will be larger
when the increase in export prices is permanent than when it is
transitory.
51V. THE FISCAL DEFICIT
V.1 Introduction
Together with the exchange rate, the fiscal deficit is the
other macroeconomic variable most likely of being part of
specific targeting in the context of structural adjustment. As we
have discussed before, the financing of the fiscal deficit will
have repercussion on domestic inflation, real interest rates or
the Trade Deficit, depending on the particular form of financing
chosen.
Ideally, the fiscal deficit should be no larger than what
can be financed without inflation or increases in internal or
external aebt that are justified by the growth rate of the
economy. It may be considered appropriate,  however, to allow for
some inflationary financing ot the deficit, to the extent that
the resulting inflation rate is compatible with a relatively
stable environment that does not act as a deterrant to structural
adjustment.
Different is the possibility of permanent debt financing in
excess of the economy's growth rate. Such situation would lead to
an increasing indebtedness ratio requiring ever rising real
interest rates in order for the debt to be rolled over and be
able to capture new funds every period. Over the medium run,
relevant for structural adjustment, we therefore feel that
internal and external financing must be limited to the
maintenance of the debt/income ratio (or any other accepted
measure of relative indebtedness).
The problem of establishing target levels on the fiscal
deficit is therefore that of finding  how much can be financed
through an acceptable inflation rate plus increases in public
debt that do not go further than what is allowed by the growth in
demand for such debt.
From a practical point of view, there is the additional
problem of measirement of the deficit. Countries do produce
several alternative measures depending on what part of the
government's operations are included:  we thus have deficits
corresponding to the Treasury, to the Consolidated General
Government, to the Non Financial Public Sector and finally, the
Central Bank deficit. To add confusion, some measures are
adjusted for inflation and others are not.  All of the above
52problems are solved if one knows for what purpose it is wanted
the fiscal deficit measure.
For our purposes we need the deficit measure that explains
how much will be the inflation rate once part of the deficit has
been financed through sustainable increases in domestic and
foreign debt. Such measure can be obtained and corresponds to the
inflation adjusted deficit of the totality of the Public Sector,
including Provinces, Municipalities, Public Enterprises and the
Central Bank.  We will now proceed to derive algebraically the
relation between this concept of the deficit, that we might name
as the "balanced growth" deficit, and the resulting inflation
rate.
V.2  The Algebra of the Balanced Growth Fiscal Deficit
We shall start by defining the variables that will be used in
the analysis. Institutional differences among countries may imply
that some of the concepts used are not operational in some cases.
We therefore present what we think is the more general case with
the understanding that the results should be modified to fit them
to the particular institutional  problems that may appear.
VARIABLES:
(1)  G: Total non-interest expenditure of the consolidated Non-
Financial Public Sector.
(2)  T: Total non-interest revenues Revenues of the CNFPS.
(3)  D: Total interest bearing internal Debt of the CNFPS plus the
Central Bank.
(4)  D*: Total external debt of the CNFPS plus the Central Bank.
(5)  H : Non interest bearing debt of the Central Bank. We
identify this measure with the Monetary Base and therefore is
linearly related to the Money Supply and inflation. In some
countries, part of the Monetary Base may be remunerated. In those
cases the definition of H would still be the Monetary Base, but
the expenditures should be modified to allow for the payment of
interest.
(6)  E: Nominal Exchange Rate: Domestic Currency per unit of
foreign exchange.
53(7) R : International Reserves of the Central Bank.
(8) Y : Nominal Income.
(9) i, i*and ir :  Nominal interest rates on domestic and foreign
debts and international Reserves.
The basic balance sheet identity requires that all government
expenditures be equal to revenues plus new issues of debt.
According to our definition of variables, government
expenditures  may  go  to  three  items: Non-interest expenditures(
G), interest service (i.D  +  E.i*.D*)  and  increases  in
international Reserves (  E.dR/dt). We assume that the government
has no assets from the private sector, so that there is no
interest income included.If  there were private assets held by the
government, the concept D should be net from those assets. We
would therefore be talking about net interest service and net
debt.
Total expenditures just defined are financed through five
items: Non-interest revenues (T),  new issues of internal debt(
dD/dt), new issues of external debt (E.dD*/dt),interest  earned on
Reserves (ir.R)  and finally,  new issues of Base Money (dH/dt).
The equality of expenditures and form of financing yields the
following budget constraint:
(1)  E.dR/dt  +  G  - T +  i.D +  E.i*.D*  =  dD/dt  +  E.dD*/dt  +
+  dH/dt +  ir.R
We now define AR, AD ,  AD* as the ratios of Reserves,
Domestic and foreign debt to Income (Y):
(2)  AR=  E.R/Y
AD= D/Y
AD*=  E.D*/Y
54Define the rate of change in Nominal Income as:
(3) (l/Y)/dY/dt  =  g + I ,  where G is the real growth rate and I
is the inflation rate.
The calculation of the "balanced growth" deficit requires
that all ratios defined in (2)  be constant over time. Any planned
increases in the relative size of some of those variables would
required adaptation of our measure of deficit during the
transitional period in which this takes place.  This would be
strictly a matter of short term monetary programing that is
outside of the scope of the problem we are analysing here. The
basic general analytical framework would, however remain the
same. If the ratios in (2)  are to remain constant, the following
restriction applies to the increases in D, D* and R:
(4)  E.dR/dt  =  AR.(I  + g  - e).Y  ,  where  e=(l/E).dE/dt,  the  rate
of nominal devaluation.
(5)  dD/dt  =  AD.(I  + g).Y
(6)  E.dD*/dt  =  AD*.(I  + g - e).Y
Two last assumptions must be made regarding the behavior of
the real exchange rate and the real interest rates. We will
assume that for the purposes of our analysis, that is finding the
inflation rate implied by a given fiscal deficit, the real
exchange rate is constant; this means that domestic inflation is
equal to the rate of devaluation plus external inflation (I*):
(7) I =  e + I*
We shall also assume that domestic and foreign nominal
interest rates are arbitraged,  which implies :
(8) i =  e +  i*
55Define:
(9) r= i - I and r*= i* - I*  as the real rates of interest.
The validity of (7),(8)  and (9) implies :
(10) r =  r*.  (A  country risk premium can be incorporated
adding the premium in (8);  the risk premium is likely to depend
on the value of AD*).
Substituting  (4)-(10 ) into (3)  we obtain the basic relation
determining the equilibrium inflation rate:
(11) I =  (d  +  AR.(g+I*-ir)-g.AH +  (r-g).(AD+AD*)}/AH
In the RHS of (11)  we find the determining factors of the
equilibrium inflation rate. If we recall that AH is the inverse
of the Velocity of Circulation of Base Money (V),  we can rewrite
(11) as:
(12)  I =  V.{  d +  AR.(g+I*-ir) +  (r-g).(AD  +  AD*)) - g
Eqn.(12) is the standard presentation for the factors
determining the equilibrium inflation rate: inflation is the
product of Velocity times the deficit as a fraction of Income
minus the growth rate of the economy. In our case, the role of
the deficit is captured by the expression within brackets, that,
to be more precise, captures all of the factors giving raise to
the rate of expansion in the supply of Base Money.  Some of those
factors are directly associated to some of the measures of fiscal
deficits; those are the ones included in the sum d+r.(AD+AD*).
Others, like those relating to reserves or the growth of the
economy, are not usually linked with the concept of deficit. We
propose the following classification of the factors contributing
to inflation in (12):
(a)  d +  r.(AD +AD*) :  Fiscal Deficit, inflation adjusted, of the
consolidated Public Sector, including the Central Bank.
(b)  AR.(g+I*-ir) :  This term represents the required purchases of
Reserves by the Central Bank and is positive on account of the
domestic growth and the seignorage from international inflation
(if  Reserves earn some interest, this should be subtracted from
56the seignorage,  as it is done with the term ir). The acquisition
of reserves is not normally included in the calculation of public
expenditures,  but  our analysis suggests that it should be  done
for the purposes of computing the equilibrium inflation rate.
(c) -g.(AD+AD*): This term represents the part of the deficit
that can be debt financed thanks to the growth of the economy
without adding pressure to the financial markets.
For a given inflation target, growth rate and sustainable
financial ratios, eqn.  (12) indicates what should be the
compatible fiscal deficit.  Such measure of the deficit
corresponds to the deficit of the consolidated public sector,
after substracting the inflation component on the totality of
interest earning government debt and adding reserve purchases by
the Central Bank. The debt concept includes the debt at all
levels of government, including the interest earning debt of the
Central Bank.
For purposes of macroeconomic policies for structural
adjustment, we recommend using the above definition of inflation
adjusted deficit as a basic element in discussing short and long
term fiscal adjustment. Regarding the level for this measure of
the deficit, we feel that in some cases the balanced growth
deficit may not be immediately implemented  as the economy may be
in initial conditions quite different from those implied by our
methodology: debt ratios may be too high or too low and it may be
desired to change them; the same problem may happen with
reserves. Finally, inflation may be quite different than the
target rate used to compute the equilibrium  balanced growth
deficit.
In spite of the above difficulties, our equilibrium deficit
concept should be still useful in designing macroeconomic policy.
This requires estimations of acceptable and sustainable financial
ratios. These ratios, in turn, will define the sustainable non-
interest deficit (d) that must be implemented  after adjustment
has taken place. In the short run, however, a larger non-interest
deficit (d)  may be allowed if it is deemed that internal or
external debt are still below the sustainable level.
The policy design in the short term would refer to the speed of
adjustment of the non-interest deficit towards the medium run
target given by the desired balanced growth deficit.
Sustainability of debt/income ratios is a difficult concept to
quantify. We have assumed that the inflationary component of
57interest rates can be automatically refinanced, on both internal
and external debt. We have also assumed that the ability of
raising new debt increases in proportion to real growth. If that
is not the case, appropriate policies should be implemented
aiming at achieving sustainable debt levels, these being defined
as those levels of debt at which automatic refinancing of
inflation and growth can be achieved. This means that in the
transition the non-interest deficit may be required to take the
full burden of the adjustment, and  even a surplus may be
required if reductions in debt levels are called for.
To the extent that access to external credit is restricted,
eqn.(12) should include only those increases in external debt
that are allowed by market conditions. Under those circumstances,
the arbitrage of interest rates may not be a reasonable
assumption. In that case, the domestic real rate of interest may
increase as AD raises, a factor crucial in determining the
feasible level for AD.
Given the importance of the case when there are restrictions
of access to external credit, we have recalculated eqn(12) to
allow for this special circumstance. To do so we have assumed
that eqn.(8) of arbitrage of interest rates is not valid and that
external debt can grow in just a fraction of the nominal interest
due: dD*/dt= v.D*, where v < i* is the part of nominal interest
that foreign creditors will supply for purposes of refinancing.
To allow for this fact, we should substitute the term(i*- v).AD*
for the term (r-g).AD* in (12) in order to obtain:
(13)  I =  V.{ d + AR.(g+I*-ir)  +  (r-g).AD +  (i*-v).AD*))  - g
Normally we would assume that  v < I* + g ,  so that there is
some limitation to the desired access to foreign credit. This in
turn implies t;hat  (i*-v)  > (r* - g) and therefore, in this case
of restricted refinancing, other sources of deficit will have to
be lowered (or inflation raised) in order to allow for the
required reduction in AD* over time.
58V.3 Short Run Dynamics
While it is outside of the scope of this paper to sresent a
detailed analysis of the problem of short run dynamic adjustment,
we can still illustrate some of the problems likely to be found
within the methodological framework developed in the previous
Section.
Since the issue of seignorage on Reserves does not seem to be
that much of practical relevance, we will make the additional
assumption that Reserves earn a real interest rate equal to the
growth rate of the economy.  With that assumption, the seignorage
term on Reserves disappears from eqn.(12).
In order to analyze short run dynamics we cannot assume that
all  the debt and reserve ratios remain constant over time.
Allowing for changes in those ratios, eqn.(12), in its short run
version, now becomes:
(14)  I =  v-g +  V.( d+(r-g).W +  dAR/dt - dW/dt)
where:
v=  (l/V)(dV/dt)  is the rate of change in velocity and
W= AD +  AD* is the total public debt/income ratio.
Assume an initial situaticn where the debt ratio is too high
and has to be reduced.  According to (14), there are two ways to
do it (leaving aside the obvious one of paying debt with
Reserves). One is to reduce d, the inflation adjusted fiscal deficit
of the public sector until the desired debt reduction is
obtained. In this case the reduction in d results in equivalent
reduction in the debt/income ratio. This amounts to the mot simple
way to pay for one's debts: reduce other spending and use the
saved proceeds to cancel outstanding debts (or, alternatively,
increase tax revenues in order to rescue debt). In this
alternative, there is no need to change the rate of creation of
Base Money and therefore we should not expect any important
effects on the inflation rate unless there are some indirect
effects of the debt reduction on desired velocity.
59The second alternative amounts to raise the inflation tax in
order to rescue the excess debt. As a consequence, inflation
during the transition will be above the desired long run level.
Since raising inflation is bound to increase velocity, the term v
will become positive and as a consequence, some of the higher
inflation will result in a reduction in real money balances. As
the base of the inflation tax is reduced, inflation should be
increased in order to provide the same needed real revenue.
It is known that there is a maximum to the amount of revenue
that can be raised with the inflation tax before generating a
hiperinflation. This amount corresponds to the solution to the
maximum value for the equation:  Max.Inf.Tax= I/V(I). Attempts to
raise a higher revenue than this maximum will require ever
increasing rates of money creation and inflation.
In general terms, we can affirm that debt reduction through
increased inflation tax is bound to increase inflation during the
process but allow a lower permanent inflation rate whenever the
real interest rate is larger than the growth rate. Conversely,
increases in debt ratios allow for a lower inflation rate in the
transition but will imply a new higher permanent inflation rate.
60VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Adjustment in the levels of key macroeconomic variables is
required in the context of Structural Adjustment on two main
grounds:
(1)  It is needed in order to provide a stable macroeconomic
environmert that should facilitate the transfer of resources
required for adjustment.
(2)  Some macroeconomic adjustments  may be required in order to
restore global equilibrium as a result of the implementation of
microeconomic measures included in the adjustment package.
(a) INFLATION TARGET
A  stable macroeconomic environment requires a stable rate of
inflation at a level that does not interfere with resource
mobilization. Such rate may depend on the specific condition of each
country. In general, we feel that inflation rates in excess of
20% per year may turn out to be unstable rates, introducing an
undesired variance in the price system. We recommend that over a
period prior to the implementation  of the main adjustment effort,
measures be taken to achieve the inflation target.
Achievement of the inflation target is to be obtained
exclusively through fiscal measures, mainly through the
determination of the balanced growth deficit compatible with such
inflation rate. Needless to say, targets must be defined over the
fundamental determinants of the inflation rate and not on the
inflation rate itself, as this is an endogenous variable not
subject to direct determination by the authorities.
61(b)  FISCAL DEFICIT
For a given inflation target, we have defined the "balanced
growth deficit" as that deficit of the consolidated public sector
that is consistent with that target and the maintenance of stable
ratios to GDP of internal and external public debt. Targets must
be defined on the path of the fiscal deficit so that it
approaches the balanced growth deficit in a reasonable period of
time, never to exceed the length of the adjustment program.
The measure of the fiscal  deficit we have obtained here as
being relevant for determining the sustainable inflation rate
corresponds to the deficit of the consolidated Public Sector,
including the Central Bank, adjusted for the inflation component
on the nominal interest paid on the public debt, both internal
and external.  Adjustment should also be made to the extent that
the growth rate of the economy allows for increasing public debt
without adding pressure to the financial  markets.
(c)  EXCHANGE RATE POLICY
Nominal exchange rate policy should aim at obtaining the
equilibrium level of the Real Exchange Rate. In this context we
view the Trade Surplus as being determined mainly by
macroeconomic factors and the Real Exchange Rate is the relative
price that allows the resource transfer dictated by the
macroeconomic factors. From this perspective, a Trade Surplus
requires a specific level of the Real Exchange Rate if it is
going to be viable without need for rationing or shortages in
markets.
We do not recommend using the real exchange rate to generate
Trade Surpluses in the absence of additional macroeconomic
adjustments. The reverse is however correct: if macroeconomic
adjustments have taken place that require a Trade Surplus, then
the Real Exchange Rate should adjust to make it possible.
We have also identified required changes in the Real
Exchange Rate in response to modifications in Terms of Trade or
Commercial Policy. The magnitude of the required adjustments is
bound to depend on the specific structure of each country. We
have presented a basic structural equation determining the Real
Exchange Rate as a function of the Terms of Trade, Tariff Rates
and the Trade Surplus. Such equation should be estimated for the
62specific country being dealt with and used to determine the
required changes in the Real Exchange Rate. Basically this
requires estimating two parameters, one being the response of the
RER with respect to the internal terms of trade (that in turn
depend on the external terms of trade and trade taxes or
subsidies) and the other measuring the response of the RER with
respect to the Trade Surplus. Regarding this last parameter we
have found significant  similarity in regressions run for three
very diverse countries (USA,Colombia  and Argentina): in all
cases, a raise of 1% in the ratio of the Trade Surplus to GDP
requires a permanent increase in the RER of about 4-5%.
(d) TRADE BALANCE
The Trade Balance is basically determined by Macroeconomic
factors. Among those we have singled out the Fiscal Deficit as
the single most significant factor contributing to the generation
of Trade Deficits.
With balanced growth, the Trade Deficit is limited by the
country's ability to raise new external debt without increasing
the relative exposure: it is therefore limited by the sustainable
growth rate of the economy. From that perspective, the
implementation of the "balanced  growth fiscal deficit" should
automatically guarantee the achievement of the corresponding
equilibrium Trade Balance provided the required equilibrium level
of the Real Exchange Rate is allowed to take place.
In the medium run, however, there may be need to obtain
improvements in the Trade Balance, probably because the external
indebtedness ratio is too high. From that perspective, the
recommendation is to induce the generation of the Trade Balance
improvement through absorption reduction methods. Irn  particular,
we feel that reductions in the fiscal  deficit should contribute
to the desired improvements in the Trade Surplus. Empirical
estimation of the relation between the Fiscal Deficit and the
Trade Deficit may help in estimating the required quantum of
fiscal adjustment. We have found a significant and stable
relationship for the case of Colombia, but this relation may not
be that much stable for other countries so as to allow for a
precise quantification. The reason is that the past relation
between both variables will be much determined by the forms of
financing of the fiscal deficit used then, and this form of
financing may not be the appropriate ones for the present
circumstances. In any event, granted that fiscal adjustment is
required, we do not discourage the use of the regression method
63as one additional piece of information for determining the
magnitude for such adjustment.
From a practical point of view, a reduction in the Fiscal
Deficit, if recommended for whatever reason, will have a positive
impact on the Trade Surplus (or reduce the deficit). In
estimating the precise magnitude of the change in the Trade
Balance we can only suggest the use of the regression technique
we have discussed in reference to the Colombian data. Given the
estimation of the required adjustment in the Trade Balance, we
can then estimate the precise adjustment required in the real
exchange rate using the less controversial regression technique
described previously. We expect the causality relation to go as
follows: reduced fiscal deficit generates improved Trade Balance
that in turn requires a real devaluation.
(e)  PUBLIC DEBT, REAL INTEREST  AND PRIVATE CREDIT
In an economy open to external credit, the public debt does
not crowd out private credit as it can be readily obtained abroad
at the prevailing real rate of interest. Countries in need of
structural adjustment, however, do not normally face unrestricted
access to external credit and getting it becomes the long run
objective of the adjustment process. In the transition, internal
public debt becomes a determining factor of the real cost of
credit. We recommend that internal public debt do not exceed a
level proportional to the size of the productive activities of
the public sector in the economy (e.g. do not include transfers
in the measure of the size of the Public Sector). Such target may
be difficult to implement initially as public debt is likely to
exceed this ratio.In that case, the least that should be required
is that this ratio be observed on all incremental credit granted
by the institutionalized financial system (mainly  Banks and
Financieras).
Short run increases in Public Debt are helpful for
instrumenting short run falls in inflation, as liquidity is
restricted. In the medium run, however, the real interest service
of such debt adds to the fiscal deficit and contributes to even
higher inflation. In addition, the real interest rate is likely
to have risen and this contributes negatively to growth and
resource mobilization. In consequence, we discourage the use of
policies based on increasing internal  public debt that go beyond
a level that requires a real interest rate in excess with that
compatible with the adjustment program. In general, most
countries trying to implement structural adjustment programs have
64gone beyond that limit as their real interest rates far exceed
the productivity of domestic investment.  Therefore, reduction in
public debt to acceptable levels (like  being proportional to the
size of the public sector) may be a fundamental  macroeconomic
condition for the success of the adjustment program.
(f)  MACROECONOMIC POLICY IN HIGHLY DISTORTED ECONOMIES
We define a highly distorted economy as one in which the
price system performs little or no role in the process of
resource allocation. Usually there are some if not all of the
following mechanism in effect:
-Price Controls
-Wage Controls
-Rationing of Foreign Exchange, Multiple Exchange Rates
-Interest rates controlled and credit rationing
In this case, predicting market behavior in order to
determine precise quantitative macroeconomic targets may be all
but impossible. Normally, one would expect that all of the above
distortions are the result of some level of excess demand in the
economy. If that is the case, and if the fiscal  deficit appears
as the main culprit, reduction of the deficit should be a primary
target.  However, we would recommend that other immediate concern
should be given at qualitative changes aimed at quick restoration
of the market mechanisms. Lifting of price controls, QR's,
exchange rate unification (and  possible floating) are measures
that can be immediately implemented. In general, we think that no
structural adjustment plan can be even devised, least
implemented, in an economy where QR's have replaced the price
system. We therefore recommend a pre-adjustment period during
which QR's are significantly reduced to acceptable levels, before
the structural adjustment program starts being devised and
implemented.
65The lifting of QR's may require macroeconomic adjustments. We
cannot offer, however, precise quantification of the required
adjustments since these will depend on the specific set of
restriction prevailing in each country. Some qualitative
direction of changes may be obtained, but I do not think one
could provide a precise taxonomy given the multiplicity of cases
one has to deal with in different countries. In the presentation
on Trade Liberalization, we have discussed some examples
regarding the appropriate measures in a process of elimination of
QR's on imports and exchange rate unification. This cases,
however, by no means pretend to cover the whole range of problems
one normally deals with in the context of QR's.
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